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The widespread use of cards is one of the most salient features
of consumer retail payment systems in the United States. American
consumers use those cards to pay for about one-fourth of their retail
purchases each year.' And this is not a static phenomenon; among
other things, the use of debit cards, 2 though still relatively small, is
rising rapidly. 3 That pattern of use is not, however, typical of other

1.
See Consumer Payment Systems, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA),
Dec. 2000, Issue 729, at 1, 6 [hereinafter 1999 U.S. Payment Systems Data]. I rely throughout
this paper on the Nilson Report for statistics regarding the American card industry. Although
the source of the statistics published in the Nilson Report is rarely clear, I follow the lead of
American government agencies and earlier academics, which generally have accepted them as
authoritative.
2.
Generally speaking, a debit card is a card that pays for transactions by removing funds
from a specified bank account at the time of the transaction. In the American market, the
functional difference between a debit card and a credit card is that the funds for a debit card
transaction are removed from the bank account automatically a few days after the transaction,
while a credit card transaction would lead to removal of funds only at the end of the month when
(if) the cardholder pays the bill. For a general introductory discussion of debit cards, see RONALD
J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 141-46 (1999).
3.
See Debit Cards at the Point of Sale in the United States 2000, NILSON REP. (HSN
Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Apr. 2001, Issue 737, at 1, 6 [hereinafter 2000 U.S. Debit Card
Data] (reporting 8.3 billion United States debit card purchase transactions in 2000, up 30% from
the previous year, for a total of $318 billion in purchases); 1999 U.S. Payment Systems Data,
supra note 1, at 1, 6 (reporting that debit cards were used for 6.1% of consumer purchases in
1999, which represented 4.7% of the dollar amount of consumer purchases); see also Visa and
MasterCard-U.S.1998, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Apr. 1999, Issue
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countries. Even in some highly industrialized nations, consumers use
cards to pay for purchases much less frequently. Statistics from the
Bank for International Settlements, for example, suggest about sixty
card-based payment transactions per person per year in the United
4
States, but only four such transactions per person per year in Japan.
But the differences go far beyond a simple willingness to use cards to
make retail payments. The average transaction for which a card is
used in Japan is much larger than the average card-paid transaction
in the United States. At the same time, Japanese cardholders are
much more likely to pay their entire bills each month than American
cardholders: borrowing beyond the first statement period appears in
only about one-tenth of Japanese credit card transactions, while about
5
half of American cardholders borrow each month.
The reasons for the differing patterns of use (or disuse) of cards
have several important policy ramifications. First, in the countries in
which cards are used frequently, their success suggests that they
generally provide payment more cheaply and effectively than
competing retail payment systems. By lowering the transaction costs
of retail transactions, those systems generally bolster the efficiency of
the economy's retail sector. Second, at least in the United States,
leading scholars associate the credit card with an embarrassingly high
rate of consumer bankruptcy--generally the highest of any
industrialized country. 6 Third, there is good reason to believe that
wide use of credit cards is inversely related to a nation's savings rate.
If, as some scholars argue, credit card usage causes the decline in
savings, 7 then policies that foster credit card usage are relevant to
those aspects of macroeconomic planning that are affected by savings
rates. Thus, concerned policymakers should welcome an enhanced
understanding of the institutional factors that motivate the use of
cards in general, or the use of cards as a borrowing device in
particular.
689, at 1, 5-7 (showing growth of Visa and MasterCard debit transactions from $400 million in
1994 to $2.9 billion in 1998).
4.

See COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT Sys., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, RETAIL

PAYMENTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 23, chart 5 (1999), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss33.pdf [hereinafter BIS, COMPARATIVE PAYMENTS STUDY].
5.
For details, see infra Part II.A.1.
6.

See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE

FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 108-40 (2000) (offering detailed data and analysis
of the relationship between the credit card industry and consumer bankruptcy in the United
States). This view is also supported by analysis from government experts. See Diane Ellis, The
Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-offs, and the
PersonalBankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDS 98-05 (FDIC, Div. of Ins., Mar. 1998).
7.
See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 127-32, 291-99 (2000).
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At the outset, it is natural to wonder whether the pattern is
dominated more by factors of social construction than by those of
institutional economics. For example, perhaps there is something
about payment cards that is uniquely attractive to certain types of
consumer personalities and perspectives. Thinking in that vein, you
might suppose that card-based payment systems are more attractive
to the relatively profligate and confident consumers of the United
States and less attractive to the more prudent and cautious consumers
in countries such as Japan.8 You also might think that the risk of
street crime could explain much of the pattern. Focusing on that
problem, you might suppose that Americans carry cards because of a
reluctance to carry cash that might be stolen from them; Japanese
have a lower incentive to carry cards because their relatively crimefree society makes it safer to carry large quantities of cash. 9
Those explanations certainly have some truth, 10 but by
themselves they cannot explain the pattern that I observe. In
8.
See id. at 301 (attributing limited credit card usage in Japan to fear of "American-style
debt"). Although it is difficult to provide objective support for such a phenomenon, recent surveys
of Japanese voters do suggest widespread discomfort with the use of credit cards. For example,
one 1991 survey of 2000 voters by Yomiuri Shimbun concluded that 64% found it not very
desirable or not very desirable at all for Japan to become a cashless society in which people did
not need to carry cash because of card-based payment systems. A 1998 survey of 2000 voters by
Asahi Shimbun reports that 59% feel uneasy when they shop with credit cards. (Summary of
survey data on file with author.) Given the widespread use of credit cards in the United States, it
would be surprising to see similar results from such surveys in this country.
9.
It is quite difficult to assess the force of that consideration, not only because it is
difficult to compare crime rates between jurisdictions with differing systems of criminal law and
different conventions for reporting offenses, but also because the relevant question is not
whether there is a difference in the actual risk of crime, but whether there is a difference in the
perceived risk of crime. Having said that, and even though official crime statistics do not include
a category for "street crime," the existing data does suggest that street crime is substantially less
common in Japan than it is in the United States. Compare GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, SUMMARY OF
THE WHITE PAPER ON CRIME tbl.I-4, at 1-5 (1998) [hereinafter, SUMMARY OF THE WHITE PAPER ON
CRIME] (reporting 2809 robbery offenses in 1997), and id. tbl.I-3, at 1-4 (reporting 1.7 million
cases of larceny in 1997), with STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 207 (2000)
(reporting 219,000 robberies on "street or highway" and 7.4 million cases of larceny, including
44,000 cases of larceny by pocket picking, and 42,000 cases of larceny by purse snatching). On
the other hand, crime appears to have been increasing in Japan during the 1990s at the same
time that credit card use has been rising, so the connection seems weak at best. See SUMMARY OF
THE WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, supra, tbl.I-4, at 80 (reporting 1586 robbery offenses in 1989); id.
tbl.I-3, at 79 (reporting 1.48 million cases of larceny in 1989).
10. I discuss the relevance of the relatively high Japanese savings rates infra pp. 35-39. As
for the perception of crime, whatever weight it might have generally, my impression is that cash
in the United States is used much less frequently even in areas (most of the areas where I have
lived in this country) where a perception of a substantial risk of mugging seems most unlikely.
For data comparing United States and Japanese willingness to use and carry cash, see infra note
16.
Another reader suggested to me the possibility that gender differences might explain some of
the disparity. If men and women have differing preferences for cash and credit cards-perhaps
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particular, because those factors are for the most part static, they
cannot explain the significant changes in Japanese card usage that
generally are making the use of Japanese cards look more and more
like American patterns.1 1 The purpose of this Article is to explore the
legal and economic institutions that might affect that pattern.
Working from that perspective, the first part of the Article
attempts to articulate the institutional factors likely to have general
explanatory power in predicting the success of a payment card system.
The analysis begins with the premise that any system of card-based
payments must operate as a network-plagued by the economic
constraints that make it difficult to bring networks into existence and
aided by the network effects that make them difficult to displace once
they have arisen. 12 This particular type of network is perhaps
uniquely difficult to create because it requires participation by three
generally separate groups of entities: the financial institutions that
issue the cards, the consumers that use them, and the merchants that
accept them. Indeed, taking account of that basic problem, it is not at
all remarkable that many countries do not have successful credit card
industries; it is somewhat more remarkable that such an industry has
succeeded anywhere.
Part I argues that four separate institutional considerations
3
are important precursors to the development of card networks:'

because of differing levels of concern about crime, or because of differing levels of receptiveness
to new technology-and if men and women make different patterns of purchases in the two
countries-perhaps because women have a more traditional role in Japanese society than they
do in the United States-then the pattern of credit card usage would be different in Japan.
Although that is an intriguing suggestion, and may provide some part of an explanation for
different usage, it seems to me even more difficult to analyze than the factors that I examine
here.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
12. For a general introductory summary, see, for example, CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN,
INFORMATION RULES 13-17 (1999); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing
Returns, and Lock-in by HistoricalEvents, ECON. J., Mar. 1989, at 116.
13. A number of other factors might have some relevance in some contexts, but they seem to
me sufficiently minor to omit from the general discussion. For example, it seems likely that the
failure of checks to develop in Japan has some relevance to the limited success of the credit card,
if only because the limited familiarity of Japanese consumers with noncash retail payment
systems at the time credit cards first were introduced might have made Japanese consumers less
receptive than American consumers. See JAPANESE BANKERS ASS'N, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN JAPAN

3 (2000) (reporting that checks are used for only 5% of Japanese noncash payments, compared to
74% of such payments in the United States). More generally, this reflects Japan's status as a
"giro" country (that is, a country that pays by cash and electronic transfer) rather than a
"cheque" country. See BIS, COMPARATIVE PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 4, at 10 (characterizing
Australia, Canada, the United States, and a few European countries as cheque countries and the
continental EU and Japan as giro countries).
For several reasons, this Article does not pursue that possibility. The biggest problem with
placing weight on the success of checks as an institutional precursor for card-based payment
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*

A regulatory environment that permits free participation by
banks in the credit card market (because depositary
institutions are best placed to develop card-based payment
and credit products);
* A retail environment that includes a substantial base of
relatively large retailers (for whom the fixed costs of
accepting credit cards are easier to bear);
" Low
telecommunication
costs
(because
low
telecommunication costs foster an effective antifraud
system);
* The size of the national retail economy (because of
economies of scale in the rapid implementation of
technological advances).14
Structurally, the first of those factors affects the supply of cards by
financial institutions; the second affects the willingness of merchants
to accept cards; and the third and fourth factors generally affect the
cost-effectiveness of the system.
The second part of the Article applies those factors to explain
the differences in the changing patterns of usage between the United
States and Japan. The last two factors are longstanding factors that
help to explain the glacial pace at which the card industry has
developed in Japan. By contrast, the first two factors have undergone
significant changes in the last decade. Thus, the Japanese retail sector
has become much more hospitable to credit cards, both because of new
legal rules regarding the types of credit cards that bank-affiliated
companies can issue and because of the appearance of the very large
retailers common in the United States. In my view, those factors go
far to explain the changing pattern of Japanese credit card usage.

systems is that the reasons for the success and failure of checks in different countries are no
better understood than the reasons for the success and failure of card-based payment systems.
The most persuasive explanation for the success of checks in the United States is the early and
forceful intervention of the Federal Reserve to provide a subsidized check collection system that
made the check the only method for long-distance payments that was free to both the payor and
the payee. See R. Alton Gilbert, The Advent of the Federal Reserve and the Efficiency of the
Payments System: The Collection of Checks, 1915-1930, 37 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 121,
128-40 (2000). To my knowledge, Japanese scholars have not yet fully explained the Japanese
experience.
14. I recognize that the last factor depends to some degree on the others. The payment card
market in Japan is much smaller than the market in the United States not so much because
Japan is a small country-it is not-but because of the effects of the other factors that have
slowed the growth of the credit card market. My point is that the smallness of the market
(caused in this case by the other factors) itself limits the system's ability to develop and grow. In
other countries that would also have small payment card markets even if cards were used
universally, that factor should have even greater significance.
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One difficulty that complicates analysis is the inextricable
relation between the credit card system and the consumer credit
industry in any particular country.15 That relation makes it difficult to
provide a clear understanding of the role that credit cards play
without an understanding of the role of consumer credit. It is not
practical in a paper of this scope to undertake a thorough analysis of
the consumer credit markets in Japan and the United States.
Recognizing that problem, Part II still attempts to provide enough
information about the consumer credit industries in the United States
and Japan to illuminate the credit card systems of the two countries.
The last part of the Article discusses debit cards, focusing on
their minuscule usage in Japan. I attribute the small role for debit
cards to the strange debit-like product into which the Japanese credit
card has developed. Because the credit card in Japan has mutated to
fill a product niche quite similar to the niche that the debit card fills
in the United States, there is little remaining room for the debit card
to succeed. Thus, although the Japanese debit card in some ways
seems to be a more effective product than the American debit
card-and in the abstract one that should be more attractive to cashpreferent Japanese consumers 1 6-- it seems unlikely to garner a
significant role in Japanese commerce.
I.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PRECURSORS OF CREDIT CARDS
AND DEBIT CARDS

Because the goal of this research is to develop a general
understanding of the institutional factors that support and retard the
15. The connection is most obvious in the sense that, at least in the United States, profits
from consumer lending on credit cards can be viewed as subsidizing the issuance of credit cards
as a payment device. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining why American cards can operate profitably

with less reliance on revenue from merchants).
16. A 1998 survey of 2000 Japanese voters by Asahi Shimbun reports that 37% of Japanese
adults carry more than V30,000 (about $270) and 81% more than Y10,000 (about $90).
(Summary of survey results on file with author.) My impression based on anecdotal evidence is
that similar figures in the United States would be much lower. The most startling data point for
me is the typical Japanese ATM policy that permits withdrawal of Y2,000,000 per day (about
$18,000), some forty times the typical United States limit. See JAPANESE BANKERS ASS'N, supra
note 13, at 16; see also Gov't, Banks Keen to Lower Debit Card Limits, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Jan. 18, 2001, available at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp [hereinafter Lower Debit Card Limits]
(reporting plans to lower the limit to V500,000). For aggregate data, see JAPANESE BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, supra note 13, at 2 (reporting that the amount of outstanding currency in Japan,
as a share of GDP, is more than twice what it is in the United States and describing "the
Japanese citizens' strong preference for using cash as a means of payment"). The difference in
the amount of cash in the hands of consumers might be even larger than that data suggests,
because the share of the American currency supply held in other countries probably is greater
than the share of the Japanese currency supply held in other countries.
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growth of card-based payment systems, it is important to start by
offering a general description of the institutional precursors identified
in my work in the United States and Japan.
A. A General Framework
As a structural matter, the most important point to make
about any card-based payment system is that successful operation
requires cooperation among a three-sided network of participants. A
card can gain a significant market share only if financial institutions
decide to issue it, consumers decide to carry it, and merchants decide
to accept it. The interactive aspect is enhanced by network effects: the
decision of any single participant to join the network has the twin
effects of making the network more valuable for all preexisting
participants and more attractive to potential participants. For
example, each merchant that decides to take the card makes the card
more useful to those consumers that already have it, which makes
consumers more likely to carry the card, which makes the card more
profitable both for other merchants that already accept the card and
for banks that already issue the card. Concurrently, by increasing the
size of the network, those events (all other things being equal) 17 make
it more beneficial for new merchants to begin accepting the card and
for new banks to begin issuing the card. 18
To understand the institutional factors likely to promote or
hinder the development of such networks, it is useful to think about
how the economics of networks affect the incentives of the individual
parties to participate. Two points are salient. The first is the unduly
low incentive that any individual party has to participate in the
network. As the preceding discussion suggests, each party that joins a
network increases the value of the network in ways that accrue to the
benefit of existing and future participants. Unless the party joining
the network can obtain compensation for those benefits that it bestows
upon the others, the incentive to join the network will (as a social
matter) be unduly low. This is the familiar "increasing returns"
problem, under which a network becomes more valuable on average to
each participant as other participants join the network.19
17. Of course, those effects could be counteracted if the effective price of the card to
consumers or merchants is raised in some way or if the market price that banks issuing the card
can charge falls in some way (perhaps because of competition among card issuers or card-issuing
networks).
18. For a general discussion of the economic implications of the network structure of the
card industry, see DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 149-63 (1999).

19.

See id. at 149-51.

2002]

CREDIT CARDS AND DEBIT CARDS

1063

Given the large number of participants in networks of this sort,
and the difficulty in defining the monetary value of those benefits, it is
not generally practical to obtain compensation for them. At most, a
party can arrogate to itself all of the benefits of one or more sides of
the network by designing the network so that a single party (or group
of related parties) is the only party on that side. Thus, for example,
entities related to American Express issue all American Express
cards; entities related to Target both issue all cards in the Target
20
network and serve as the sole merchants that accept the cards.
The second point relates to the three-sided nature of this
particular type of network. Because a payment card network can arise
only with concurrent participation by three groups of entities, the
institutional environment that will support the deployment of
payment cards must be one that includes favorable conditions on all
three sides of the triangle: favorable conditions for participation by
financial institutions that issue the cards, by merchants that accept
the cards, and by consumers that carry them.
B. A Set of Precursors
Examining the payment card system from the perspective
discussed above, four particular factors appear to have general use in
explaining the success or lack of success of payment card systems: the
breadth of banking powers; the existence of relatively large
merchants; the level of telecommunication costs; and the size of the
retail economy.
1.

Banking Powers

As a logical matter, one of the most important institutional
precursors for a card-based payment system would be a regulatory
climate that permits free participation by those best placed to issue
the cards. This Article's most important thesis is that banks
traditionally have been best placed to issue those cards, and thus a
regulatory climate that excludes banks will retard the development of
the card industry. Several difficulties plague my analysis of that
factor, which motivate me to analyze it at greater length than I do the
other factors (which are more intuitively obvious). For one thing, my
theoretical basis for claiming a connection between bank regulations
and the success of the credit card industry is not initially
overwhelming: there is no obvious reason why nondepositary
20. For a discussion of some of the economic advantages of closed-loop card systems, see id.
at 158-63.
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institutions cannot successfully deploy card-based payment products.
To be sure, nondepositary institutions do have a significant
disadvantage
in promulgating
debit cards-only
depositary
institutions have immediate access to the accounts against which
debit card payments are made. But no such difficulty bars
participation by nondepositary institutions in the credit card industry.
Still, although my theoretical understanding remains quite tentative,
the historical record in the United States and Japan provides
considerable support for my thesis. Accordingly, I defer discussion of
theoretical explanations for that phenomenon, and first offer a brief
summary of the historical patterns.
a. HistoricalPatterns
As others have explained, the credit card market as it exists in
the United States today developed in the late 1960s and 1970s out of a
relatively small earlier market for payment cards exemplified by
American Express, Diners Club, and Carte Blanche. 2 1 As the name
"payment" card suggests, those cards did not contemplate an
extension
of
credit;
they
provided
only
a
payment
function-facilitating transactions at distant merchants that would be
22
reluctant to accept checks from the cardholder.
The general purpose credit card-and the high rate of
borrowing that makes that card profitable-did not develop until the
1970s and 1980s, and when it did develop it came largely from efforts
23
by American banks (primarily Bank of America in California).
Notwithstanding the first-mover advantage of its initially dominant
payment card, American Express--an experienced, sophisticated, and
well-capitalized player in the financial marketplace--was unable to
develop a successful credit card product. Indeed, its repeated
unsuccessful efforts to develop a successful credit card product have
resulted in staggering monetary losses. 24 The credit card as a
borrowing device developed uniquely as a bank product.
A similar pattern appears in Japan, which has a long history of
regulatory limitations on the participation of banks and their affiliates
in the credit card market. That may sound odd to outsiders
21. See, e.g., id. at 61-84.
22. See id. at 62-65. The market for that card depended on a sufficiently large country for
remote travel to be frequent and also on a payment market in which checks were common. Those
cards filled a niche created by the difficulty of using existing noncash payment systems
(principally checks) to make payments in remote locations.
23. See id. at 65-69.
24. See id. at 75 (discussing heavy losses incurred by American Express in its attempts to
enter the credit card market).
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accustomed to thinking of Japanese bank regulation as weaker than
bank regulation in other countries, but in this case it seems to have
been caused by a battle between two Japanese agencies: the Ministry
25
of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
Although the precise reason for the exclusion is not clear,26 it was
1992 before bank-affiliated issuers were permitted to issue cards that
allowed revolving credit. 2 7 Thus, at least as to borrowing transactions,
the pre-1992 credit card market was dominated by shinpan kaisha
and other nonbank lenders. It was not until 2001 that companies
affiliated with Japanese banks permitted to issue cards that include
all of the other borrowing options typical of the Japanese card
28
industry.

25. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCcALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL
MARKETPLACE 55-57 (1993).
26. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth argue that the exclusion was designed to
protect smaller credit companies that would have suffered from competition with the banks. See
id. There is some reason to think, though, that the regulation in fact was designed to protect
small retailers rather than small credit companies. That might seem counterintuitive-because
credit limitations in fact could harm small retailers by lowering their sales--but contemporary
sources suggest it as a possibility. For a source discussing the need to protect small retailers, see
Kurejitto Sangy5 Bukai, Kappu Hanbai Shingikai [The Credit Industry Committee in the
Installment Sales Council], Kurejitto Sangy5 no Kongo no Arikatani tsuite [Interim Report: The
Desirable Future of the Credit Industry] (1990) (discussing the need for protection of small

retailers as part of the historical background behind the restriction preventing bank-affiliated
issuers from issuing cards that allow revolving credit).
27. No specific statute barred revolving credit, but the legislative sentiments expressed in a
resolution accompanying a statute that amended the Installment Sales Law caused the
government to bar bank-affiliated entities from offering revolving credit. For the resolution itself,
see Kappu Hanbaih5 no Ichibu wo Kaiseisuru Hritsuanni Taisuru Futai Ketsugi
[Supplementary Resolution Amending Installment Sales Law] (May 10, 1984). For discussion of
its significance to later policy, see KINYU IT KENKYUKAI [STUDY GROUP REGARDING
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES], DEBITTO ZkDO KAKUMEI [THE REVOLUTION
IN DEBIT CARDS] 53-54 (Takarajimasha 2000) [hereinafter THE REVOLUTION IN JAPANESE DEBIT
CARDS]; Dai Ippen Kurejitto Sangy5 no Jittai [Part 1: The History and Current Situation of
Credit Industries], in KUREJITTO TORIHIKI JITSUMUZENSHO [CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE]
110 (Daiichih5ki 1991) [hereinafter CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE].
28. It is not unusual in Japanese credit card transactions that involve borrowing to call for
repayment in three equal monthly installments ("sankai barai") or in ten equal monthly
installments ("jukkai barai"), or out of the cardholder's semiannual bonus. Those options were
not permitted to bank-affiliated card issuers by the 1992 decision. The government ultimately
decided to permit bank-affiliated card issuers to offer all of the common forms of borrowing. See
Tokubestu Ronbun: Kiny2 Sdbisuni Okeru Kddo no Yakuwari to Tenbd [Special Report: The
Perspective and Functionof Cards in FinancialServices], in KINYU JYOHO SHISUTEMU HAKUSHO
3, 25 (Zaikeishbh~sha 2000); THE REVOLUTION IN JAPANESE DEBIT CARDS, supra note 27, at 96-

97; Kurejitto Sangy5 Bukai, Kappu Hanbai Shingikai [The Credit Industry Committee in the
Installment Sales Council], Kurejitto Kado no Seidoteki Seiyaku no Kaiketsu no Arikata to
Kurejitto Sangyd ni Kyotsasuru Kadai e no Torikumi ni Kansuru H6koku [Interim Report: The
Way to Solve Structural Limitations in Credit Cards and a Program for Solving Common
Problems in Credit Industries] (1998).
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Two points about the resulting market structure (both
discussed in more detail in Part II) are central to my conclusions.
First, for decades after its introduction in Japan, the credit card was
not successful either in gaining a significant market share as a matter
of transaction volume or, even more surprising, in luring consumers
into borrowing with the cards when they did use them. 29 Second,
during the nine years since bank affiliates have been able to issue
cards with substantial borrowing options, the usages in Japan have
begun to move (albeit slowly) to bring Japanese usage closer to the
American pattern. 30 The movement of Japanese usage to resemble the
United States experience shortly after those institutional changes at
least suggests the significance of untrammeled bank participation in
credit card markets.
b. Theoretical Explanations
The biggest difficulty is in explaining precisely why
nondepositary credit card issuers have been unable to develop
successful credit card products. For me, two explanations are
plausible: one that relies on the informational advantage banks gain
from depositary relations and another on the value of credit cards as a
service to enhance the attractiveness to the customer of the bank as a
location for the customer's deposits.
The first explanation is the possibility that the information
that banks acquire from their depositary and other relations with
their customers gave them a superior position to design credit card
lending services. It is easy to forget, but the credit card business was
extraordinarily risky in the early days when the modern credit card
31
business model was developed.
If it was difficult even for banks with their customer relation
information to develop the sophistication necessary for a profitable
credit card operation focused on their depositary customers, it is
plausible to think that other types of financial institutions without
29. See infra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the limited success of Japanese credit cards).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
31. See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 68-69 (discussing large losses in the
early days of the credit card industry incurred by, among others, Wells Fargo, Bankers Trust,
and Citibank); id. at 75 (discussing heavy losses incurred by American Express in its attempt to
enter the credit card market); MANNING, supra note 7, at 84-86 (discussing heavy losses incurred
by Chase Manhattan and Bank of America); id. at 89-91 (discussing $100 million in losses by
Citibank in the 1970s and characterizing the late 1970s and early 1980s as a "Dickensian
nightmare" for the industry as a whole); see also Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards,
3 CHAPMAN L. REV. 79, 137-38 (2000) (arguing that the credit card industry traditionally has
been "dynamically competitive," so that earlier entrants periodically are replaced by late-coming,
more effective rivals).
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such informational advantages might have been cautious (or
unsuccessful) in pushing into the area. Of course, it seems unlikely
that the informational advantage would have great relevance in the
modern market. In the current information-rich environment, it is no
longer the case that the depositary relation is the only reliable-or
even the best--source of information about the creditworthiness of a
potential credit cardholder. Accordingly, any advantage that banks
might have held when the system developed should have dissipated
over time.
The second explanation builds on the difficulty encountered by
the credit card industry in its early days. From that perspective, the
credit card began not as a profitable line of business, but rather as a
costly service that banks provided as a convenience to attract
customers.3 2 Given the limited ability of banks in the 1960s and 1970s
to compete on price, 33 it would have been rational for banks to attempt
to distinguish themselves from one another by offering credit card
services even if they were unable to provide those services in a
profitable manner. 34 After decades of practice, however, the industry
developed sufficient expertise to earn considerable profits from credit
card lending. 35 At that point, it would be rational for other issuers to
enter the market vigorously, even if they did not have substantial
depositary relations with their cardholders.
Given the foregoing, it should be no surprise that
nondepositary institutions in the United States now are quite
successful at credit card lending. For example, store cards in the
36
United States have a phenomenal ability to generate borrowings.
32. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 89-91 (characterizing credit cards before the 1980s as
"loss leader[s that] helped to cultivate customer loyalty and attract new clients").
33. See, e.g., MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 968 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the
importance to the market of the limitations on bank-deposit interest imposed by the Federal
Reserve's Regulation Q).
34. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 84 (explaining that the first large-scale use of a universal
bank credit card resulted from a mailing by Bank of America of 60,000 unsolicited credit cards to
its depositary customers).
35. Cf. Arthur J. Alexander, Consumer Credit in Japan Since the Bubble Economy's End,
JAPAN ECON. INST. REP., June 20, 1997 (arguing that Japanese banks are handicapped in credit
card lending because they have not had sufficient experience to develop expertise in individual
risk assessment), available at http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR97/9723f.html#whos.
36. At the end of 2000, the ratio of outstanding receivables to total annual purchase volume
for United States store cards was 77%, which compares 'favorably to the analogous ratios for
MasterCard (76%), Visa (55%), Discover (53%), and American Express (23%). (The ratio for store
cards is calculated from Store Cards in the U.S. 2000, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc.,
Oxnard, CA), June 2001, Issue 741, at 1, 6-7. The ratios for Visa and MasterCard are calculated
from Year 2000 Results U.S. General Purpose Cards, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc.,
Oxnard, CA), Apr. 2001, Issue 738, at 1, 4-5 [hereinafter 2000 U.S. Card Data]. The ratios for
American Express and Discover are calculated based on year 2000 results published at Amex
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But they showed no capacity to generate those borrowings in the early
days of the industry, before banks developed and popularized the
37
credit card model.
It is also true that much of the credit card market in the
United States has been taken over by "monoline" banks, which
generally have no depositary relation with their customers. Thus, as of
1995, only sixteen percent of MasterCard and Visa cards issued in the
United States were issued to cardholders that had any relationship
with the issuing bank beyond the card. 38 But those banks appeared
quite late in the development of the credit card market in the United
States. 3 9 And they depend for their success on the economies of scale
in sophisticated analysis--"credit scoring"-of the individuals to whom
they issue cards. 40 With that type of technology, it is easy to see that
the bank's customer relation information is not nearly so important as
41
it might have been in the early days of the industry.

In sum, there are good reasons to think that a regulatory
climate that grants banks free entry into the credit card market is a
substantial factor leading to the development of a large credit card
market. The mechanism is not entirely clear, but there are good
reasons to think that the market would not have developed in the
United States in the absence of the profitable and informationgenerating depositary relationship between banks and potential
cardholders.

Results-U.S., NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Jan. 2001, Issue 732, at 1, 7
and Discover Card Results, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Jan. 2001, Issue
732, at 1, 7.) For a discussion of historical trends of that ratio, see infra note 58.
37. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 61-62 (discussing in-house cards in the
early days of the industry); GEORGE RITZER, EXPRESSING AMERICA: A CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL

CREDIT CARD SOCIETY 33-34 (1995) (discussing the limited use of revolving credit in the early
days of the industry).
38. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 209.
39. See, e.g., id. at 12 (discussing the rise of monoline banks in the early 1990s).
40. See Miriam Kreinin Souccar, Providian Pitch Spurs Fear of Credit Data Poaching,AM.
BANKER, Dec. 6, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 21145379 (discussing underwriting techniques
of monoline banks); Jane Tanner, Investing: Everyday Plastic, Spun into Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2000, § 3, at 7 (same).
41. Looked at from another perspective, the monoline bank-credit card issuer without
depositary relation-in some ways resembles the shinpan kaisha that is an important player in
the Japanese market. The key difference, of course, is that the shinpan kaisha's transactions
have a much lower share of borrowing than those of the typical American monoline bank. See
infra note 64 (reporting estimates of the rate of borrowing in shinpan kaisha transactions).
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Merchant Size

Looking at the network from the merchant side, the typical size
of merchants that accept the cards also could affect the deployment
and growth of payment card networks. That is true because there are
nontrivial fixed costs that are incurred when a merchant decides to
accept credit cards. For example, in the modern era, a merchant that
accepts a major credit card must acquire an authorization terminal
that can swipe the card (to obtain data from the magnetic stripe or
chip on the card) and contact the credit card network to determine if
42
the card issuer will authorize the transaction.
The decision whether it is profitable for a merchant to accept a
card depends upon the profits from taking the card-the profits in new
sales, reduced by the charges the merchant pays for accepting the card
(charges that the merchant incurs not only in card-induced sales, but
in all sales in which the card is used).43 All other things being equal,
larger merchants are likely to have more card-induced transactions
than smaller merchants, and thus a greater incentive to incur the
costs to accept the card. 44
3.

Telecommunications Costs

At this point, I turn to general factors--those which affect
neither the supply nor the demand for cards, but the costliness of
operating the system effectively. The most obvious consideration of
that type is the relative level of telecommunications costs. Those costs
affect the deployment of an effective credit card system because of the
importance of telecommunications to an effective antifraud system.
Most obviously, effective protections against fraudulent credit card
transactions require the merchant to contact the issuer at the time of
the transaction to permit the issuer to consider the likelihood that the
transaction is fraudulent. Ideally (and typically, in the United States,
at least),45 that process starts with a swiping of the card at the
42. See infra note 167. The cost of the terminal might nominally be borne by either the
merchant or the credit card network, but in any event they must be incurred, which is the
relevant question here. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 121-27.
43. For a more detailed discussion of that point, see infra note 165.
44. In a market in which the network is bearing the fixed costs, the analysis is similar-the
network will be more likely to earn sufficient profits from the merchant's acceptance of the card
if the merchant uses the card for more transactions, which is more likely for larger merchants
than for smaller merchants.
45. See Smart Card Economics-U.S., NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA),
Sept. 2000, Issue 724, at 1, 5 (reporting that over ninety-five percent of Visa and MasterCard
transactions in the United States are authorized in real time, a higher rate than in any other
country).
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merchant's counter. The terminal at which the card is swiped
transmits to the issuer not only the card number, but also additional
information on the magnetic stripe (which helps to demonstrate the
authenticity of the card) and information about the transaction (which
helps the issuer to assess the likelihood that the cardholder is in fact
46
engaged in the transaction).
Because such a process necessarily involves some form of
online connection between the merchant and the issuer, high
telecommunication costs pose an obstacle to such systems. 47 The
reason is that the more it costs the merchant to place those calls, the
more likely it is that the cost of making such calls routinely will
exceed the expected present value of the losses from fraud that such
calls will deter. Hence, the level of those costs presents a kind of
friction setting the level below which it is not profitable to deter fraud:
the lower those costs, the more vigorous (and successful) the system
can be in efforts to eradicate fraud.
As it happens, it is widely recognized that Japan has
telecommunication costs that are among the highest of any developed
nation. 48 Among other things, those costs typically include charges on
a per-call and per-minute basis that are relatively unusual in Western
countries. 49 All other things being equal, those high costs should pose
an obstacle to effective prevention of fraudulent transactions.
4.

Economies of Scale

The simplest of the institutional precursors is economies of
scale. Like most large-volume transactions, advances in information
technology are important in a variety of ways-not only in the initial
issuance of the cards (discussed above), but also in the processing of
46. For a basic description of that process, see MANN, supra note 2, at 111-12.
47. See Smart Card Economics-U.S., supra note 45, at 5 (connecting the careful
authorization practices in the United States with the perception that "[c]osts for POS [point-ofsale] terminals, telecommunications, and cardholder and merchant account processing are
cheaper than anywhere else in the world").
48.

See, e.g., RICHARD KATZ,

JAPAN: THE SYSTEM THAT SOURED 35 (1998) (discussing

reasons for relatively high telecommunications costs in Japan); Japanese Government Panel
Urges End to NTT Stranglehold,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL
24691668 (noting that local charges in Japan (for which NTT has a monopoly) have risen by
thirteen percent since 1985, while long-distance charges (for which NTT faces competition) have
fallen by seventy-eight percent); Mark Magnier, Japan'sBig Hang-Up, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2000,
at Cl, available at 2000 WL 2247206 (arguing that Japanese telephone interconnection charges
are about four times those in the United States and Britain and two-and-a-half times those in
France and Sweden).
49. Akiko Kashiwagi & Clay Chandler, Foes Hoping to Tether Japan's Telecom Giant,
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2001, at E1 (discussing NTT's practice of charging by the call and minute
for telephone calls in Japan).

CREDIT CARDS AND DEBIT CARDS

2002]

1071

transactions.5 0 Because we live in a period when that technology is
developing and improving so rapidly, economies of scale are likely to
be important in the rapid development and deployment of that
technology. 5 1 Thus, all other things being equal, marginally larger
countries should be able to deploy more sophisticated technology more
rapidly than marginally smaller countries.5 2 As a result, the systems
in marginally larger countries should become more effective-less
costly and more impervious to fraud-more rapidly than systems in
53
marginally smaller countries.

II.

CREDIT CARDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Turning from abstract analysis to specifics, I start with the
credit card, the dominant card-based payment system in the world.
My analysis of the credit card proceeds in two steps. First, I discuss
how consumers use the cards in the two countries. Second, I discuss
how effectively the system processes the transactions in which the
cards are used.

50. See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 7, at 85, 87 (discussing research and development that
led to technological advances making it easier for credit card operations to become profitable).
Some evidence of this phenomenon appears in the increasing concentration of the various sectors
of the credit card market. For example, in the market for acquiring and processing credit card
transactions, First Data had a 44% market share as of 1999 (up from 36% in 1998). The top ten
acquirers increased their market share from 65.5% in 1997 to 76.2% in 1999. See Top U.S.
Acquirers, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Apr. 2000, Issue 713, at 1, 9
[hereinafter 1999 US Acquisition Data] (reporting increases in concentration from 1998 to 1999);
Top U.S. Acquirers, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Mar. 1999, Issue 688, at
1, 9 (reporting increases in concentration from 1997 to 1998). In the market for issuing cards, the
top five issuers currently control 57% of the market and the top ten issuers control 82% of the
market. Ten years ago in 1990, the top five issuers controlled 36% and the top ten issuers
controlled only 51%. Twenty years ago in 1980, the top fifty card issuers controlled less than 60%
of the market. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 298; Superportfolios, NILSON REP. (HSN
Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Feb. 2001, Issue 733, at 1, 6-7.
51. See RITZER, supra note 37, at 42-43 (discussing economies of scale in the United States
credit card industry).
52. Of course, once the technology is developed and freely available, it may be that
economies of scale in use of the technology are minimal. Thus, this factor suggests only a slowing
of the pace of development, not a permanent difference in the level of development.
53. As discussed in the introduction, the analysis assumes that national borders still matter
in the development of payment systems. That assumption is, of course, one that weakens with
the rise of globalization.
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A. Usage in the United States and Japan
1. Describing the Transactions
In the market for retail purchases in the United States, the
credit card is a massive success: it was used in 1999 for 14 billion
54
transactions worth almost $1.1 trillion, about $76 per transaction.
U.S. Department of Commerce statistics indicate that in the same
year credit cards were used in about eighteen percent of all
transactions, for about twenty-three percent of the value paid in all
American consumer payment transactions. 55 For the most part, those
transactions were conducted as revolving credit transactions. 56 Under
American practices, that means that the cardholder decides each
month what share of the total account balance it will pay back; the
cardholder is required to make only a tiny minimal payment, in an
amount that often would not amortize the entire balance for several
years.57 In practice, somewhat more than half of American cardholders
take advantage of that option to defer payment of some or all of their
credit card account balance each month.58 The payments that they do
54. See Credit & Debit Cards, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Nov.
2000, Issue 726, at 1, 7 [hereinafter 1999 U.S. Card Data].
55. See 1999 U.S. Payment Systems Data, supra note 1, at 1, 6. The credit card's share of
retail purchase transactions doubtless is even higher, because the share that credit cards have
for nonretail payment transactions surely is lower (close to zero) than the share that they have
for retail payment transactions. Cash, by the way, was used in 44% of all United States payment
transactions, but those transactions had an average amount of only $20.08, totaling less than
19% of the total dollar transaction volume. Id.
56. In American terminology, the principal exception is a "payment card" like American
Express, which requires full payment of the balance each month. In terms of transaction value at
the merchant point of sale, American Express currently has about a fifteen percent share of the
American market. See U.S. Annual Credit Card Charge Volume by Brand-Current,available at
http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/chargevolume.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2001). Even
with American Express, however, the cardholder has the power to withhold payment by the
simple expedient of neglecting to mail a check. That differs from the arrangements discussed
below for Japan, in which the issuer receives funds on the payment date through a debit transfer
from the cardholder's account. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
57. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 352 n.57; RITZER, supra note 37, at 95-96. The perception
that those options are too lenient has motivated congressional efforts to require various remedies
designed to ensure consumer awareness of the length of time repayment would take at the
minimum payment rates. See Dean Anason, Bankruptcy Bill Is Getting Last-Minute Tweaks, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 10, 1999, at 2 (discussing possible disclosure requirements), available at 1999 WL
21143154; Dean Anason, LaFalce Sees Compromise as Reform's Best Hope, AM. BANKER, Apr. 29,
1999, at 3 (same), available at 1999 WL 6034812; Michelle Heller, Bankruptcy Reform on the
Hill's Fast Track, AM. BANKER, Feb. 7, 2001, at 1 (same), available at 2001 WL 3909314.
58. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 102 (reporting industry estimates of an increase in
convenience users from 31% in 1990 to 43% in 2000); Mickey Meece, Rise in Consumer Debt Burden Is an Illusion, MasterCard Says, AM. BANKER, Mar. 18, 1997, at 14 (reporting industry
studies indicating that 60% of credit card users pay off their charges before interest accrues),
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make are made for the most part by writing a check and mailing it to
the issuer.
The contrast with Japan is considerable. First, Japanese
consumers plainly do not use cards as frequently as American
consumers: one recent study, for example, indicated that even
excluding cash transactions (by all accounts the dominant method of
point-of-sale payment in Japan),5 9 credit cards accounted for only ten
percent of the value of payment transactions. 60 Industry statistics
indicate only Y21.58 trillion ($195 billion) of credit card transactions
61
in 2000, about six percent of Japanese consumer spending that year.
That reflects purchases of about $1,650 per capita, as compared to
about $3,500 per capita in the United States. 62 The data also show
that the average credit card transaction is about three times as large
in Japan as it is in the United States, in the range of V25,000 ($225).63
available at 1997 WL 4748488; Jeremy Simon, More Users of Plastic Wielding It More Wisely,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 18, 1999, at K05 (reporting an increase in "convenience users" from
29% in 1990 to 42% in 1997), available at 1999 WL 4295534; Miriam Kreinin Souccar, Mortgage
Refinancing Slump Good for Card Firms, AM. BANKER, Jan. 18, 2000, at 1 (reporting
MasterCard statistics indicating that only 54% of its customers retained balances in 1998, down
from 57% in 1997), available at 2000 WL 3358981. A good way to understand the trend is to
track the ratio of outstanding balances at any given time against the annual credit card
purchase volume. That figure was above 70% throughout the early 1990s, but fell to 68% in 1998,
57% in 1999, and 53% in 2000. See The Evolving Bank Card Industry, NILSON REP. (HSN
Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Sept. 1999, Issue 699, at 1, 6 (discussing the historical trends in
that metric); 1999 U.S. Card Data, supra note 54, at 1, 7 (reporting data from which I calculate
the 1999 figure); Credit Cards in the U.S., NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA),
Dec. 2000, Issue 730, at 1, 5 (reporting the 2000 figure).
59. See supra notes 13, 16.
60. See JAPANESE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 13, at 3. As mentioned above, credit cards in
the United States accounted for 21% of the value of transactions even when cash is included.
Excluding the 19% of transaction value handled by cash (to make the figures comparable), the
share of credit cards in the United States would rise to 26%, more than twice the Japanese
share.
61. See Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, METI: Current Survey of Selected
Service Industries. available at http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/index.html. For a similar
estimate, see Credit Cards in Japan: A Borrower Be, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2001, at 71, 71
[hereinafter METI Credit Card Data] (relying on a report from Deutsche Securities stating that
purchases on credit cards account for eight percent of consumer spending).
62. The $3,500 figure is calculated from the data supra text accompanying note 54. See also
supra note 4 and accompanying text (reporting four card transactions per person per year in
Japan compared to more than sixty in the United States).
63. I base that estimate on 1999 statistics from the Bank for International Settlements,
which show 825 million transactions for a total of Y18.4 trillion ($165 billion). COMM. ON
PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICS ON PAYMENT SYSTEMS
IN THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 61-62 tbls.12, 13 (2001) [hereinafter BIS, 1999 PAYMENTS
STATISTICS], available at http://www.bis.org/pub/cpss44.pdf. Although the table is not explicit on
that point, I believe that it includes only credit card use for purchase activity, because the total
transaction value is similar to statistics published by the Japan Consumer Credit Industry
Association (JCCIA). JCCIA statistics show a total of ¥20 trillion ($180 billion) in Japanese
credit card shopping transactions for 1999. NIHON NO SHOHISHA SHINY() TOKEI [JAPAN
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Perhaps the most striking feature of the Japanese transactions
is the limited extent to which they involve credit. The overwhelming
majority-about
eight-five percent--of Japanese credit card
transactions are settled by "ikkai barai"(which means something like
"payment in one cycle"). 64 Under ikkai barai, the consumer agrees that
the transaction will be paid to the issuer in full on the next monthly
payment date. 65 Also different from American practice is the timing of
the payment decision: where American cardholders typically decide
their repayment schedule when they receive their monthly bills, the
Japanese cardholder typically makes that decision at the cash register
at the time of the sale.
The full implications of ikkai barai for the credit card system
come from its interaction with the general absence of the check from
the Japanese consumer payment system. 66 The ordinary Japanese
consumer pays bills by a credit transfer or a prearranged debit
transfer (similar to the automated clearinghouse transactions
American consumers often use to pay mortgages or other regularly
recurring bills). Thus, in the credit card transaction, the customer's
consent to ikkai barai amounts to a general commitment to pay in one
month-analogous to the American cardholder's general commitment
when it signs a credit card slip that it will repay "in accordance with
the agreement with the card issuer." The consent to ikkai barai also
includes an authorization for a transfer out of the customer's account
67
to pay the transaction shortly after the last day of the payment cycle.
Because the cardholder at the point of purchase already has given the
CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, CONSUMER CREDIT STATISTICS OF JAPAN] 30 (2001)

[hereinafter JCCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS].
64. None of the published aggregate industry data separates out the precise share of ikkai
barai or revolving credit; instead it divides transactions into "kappu," those which involve a
substantial deferral of payment, and "hikappu," those which do not. Hikappu generally includes

not only ikkai barai, but also nikai barai (payment in two installments) and bonus payment
(repayment out of the cardholder's biannual bonus). Kappu includes revolving credit and
installment plans that are both three or more payments and two or more months. See Kappu
hanbaih5 [INSTALLMENT SALES LAW], Law No. 159 of 1961, art. 2(3). For the industry as a whole,

data from the JCCIA shows that kappu transactions as of 1999 were only 11.8% of all
transactions, and only 1.7% of transactions at bank-affiliated card issuers. See JCCIA ANNUAL
STATISTICS, supra note 63, at 49-50. My sense that ikkai barai constitutes almost all of the
hikappu transactions is based on several anonymous interviews at Japanese financial
institutions.
65. See JCB Card Rules and Regulations, arts. 8, 9(1) (undated) [hereinafter JCB
Cardholder's Agreement] (providing for calculation of charges as of the 15th day of each month,
mailing of a statement showing those charges, and a bank transfer to pay the charges on the
10th day of the following month).
66. See supra note 13.
67. See JCB Cardholder's Agreement, supra note 65, art. 9(1) (establishing payment cycles
that end on the 15th day of each month, with payments transferred on the 10th day of the
following month).
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issuer access to a specified amount of funds in a specified account, the
transaction resembles much more closely an American debit card
68
transaction than an American credit card transaction.
After the end of each payment cycle, the issuer sends the
cardholder a statement summarizing the charges. 69 Absent an
affirmative and timely objection by the cardholder, the issuer causes
the funds to be transferred from the cardholder's bank account to the
issuer's account on the designated date.70 When the cardholder uses
ikkai barai, there typically is no interest or other charge for the
deferral of payment from the date of the transaction to the monthly
payment date.7 1 Thus, the roughly eighty-five percent share of
transactions processed by ikkai barai involves no significant extension
of credit by the issuer. When credit is extended, the rates are
relatively modest by American standards, in the range of twelve
percent per annum. 72

68. This method of paying credit card bills is not unique to Japan. My discussion with
European students suggests that it is common in Europe as well. That may reflect the similarity
of continental Europe to Japan in that neither has checks as a substantial consumer payment
system. See supranote 13.
69. See JCB Cardholder's Agreement, supra note 65, art. 8 (providing for a statement sent
by ordinary mail describing all charges made by the 15th day of each calendar month).
70. See id. arts. 8, 9(1) (authorizing a payment on the 10th day of the month if the customer
does not object within one week of the customer's receipt of the monthly statement). In the rare
case in which the card is issued directly by a bank, the bank might take the funds by a simple
removal of funds from the account. In the more common case in which the card is issued by some
entity that is not a bank (that is, a bank affiliate, shinpan kaisha, or retailer-affiliated card
issuer), the issuer obtains the funds by a bank-debit transfer. See id. art. 9(1) (granting
permission for the bank transfer); Anonymous Interview Two, in Tokyo, Japan (Sept. 19, 2000)
[hereinafter Anonymous Interview Two]. The need for the issuer to obtain payment by such a
transfer means that issuers will issue cards only to consumers that have bank accounts at
institutions with which the issuer has a debit-transfer agreement. Most issuers have such
relations with several institutions, but those relations are sufficiently limited that the need for
such a relation apparently does constrain issuers' ability to issue cards. See Anonymous
Interview Three, in Tokyo, Japan (Sept. 22 & Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview
Three].
71. See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70. There is nothing unusual about the
absence of interest in those transactions; it is similar to the typical American practice, in which
there is no interest charge for convenience users that pay their bills in the entirety each month.
See Zywicki, supra note 31, at 101-04 (analyzing the competitive reasons that have led the
American market to that pattern).
72. Because rates vary considerably even within a single issuer's portfolio, and because the
pattern of rates an issuer charges is highly proprietary, it is difficult to generalize on that point
or to provide specific data from specific issuers. I offer the estimate in the text as a general
impression based on the interviews I conducted in Japan.
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Table 1
Summary Comparison of
Japanese and United States Credit Card Usage

Purchases per Capita
Share of Consumer

UNITED STATES

JAPAN

$3,500
21%

$1,650
6%

26%

10%

$76

$200

50%

10%

Spending

Share of Noncash
Payments

Mean Transaction
Amount
Use for Borrowing

2. Explaining the Differences
The foregoing section suggests three salient differences
between Japanese and United States credit card use: the transactions
in Japan are less common, larger, and less often involve significant
borrowing (by which I mean borrowing that results in the payment of
interest to the card issuer). Each of those differences, I believe, is at
least partially attributable to differences in the institutional
precursors discussed in Part I. Two of those precursors are sufficiently
obvious to make extended discussion superfluous. First, Japan's retail
economy, albeit one of the largest on the planet, is significantly
smaller than that of the United States. Thus, any economies of scale
in the deployment of information technology would render the
Japanese system marginally less effective than the United States
system. Second, it is widely recognized that Japan has
telecommunication costs that are among the highest of any developed
nation. Both of those precursors contribute to higher costs that should
make the Japanese systems less competitive than their counterparts
in the United States.
In my view, however, the costs that plausibly can be attributed
to those precursors cannot explain the specific pattern of differences
described above: not only the limited usage of cards, but also the large
size of the transactions and the limited amount of borrowing. To the
extent institutional factors can explain those differences, the limited
powers of Japanese banks and the relatively small size of Japanese
retailers appear to me to be the best explanations. Accordingly, I defer
discussion of the relevance of telecommunication costs and economies
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of scale to the next section. 73 This section compares the explanatory
power of the disempowered-bank hypothesis, the merchant-size
hypothesis, and several potential alternative explanations.
a. The Disempowered-Bank Hypothesis
In comparing the power of various potential explanations, I am
influenced strongly by data suggesting that credit card use in Japan
over the last several years has displayed a marked convergence with
the American pattern of usage on each of the axes of difference
discussed above. First, Japanese use of credit cards more than doubled
between 1995 and 1999 (from 371.8 million transactions to 824.8
million transactions). 74 Second, because the amount of the
transactions rose by less than fifty percent (from Y13.3 trillion ($120
billion) to Y18.8 trillion ($165 billion), the average transaction
decreased by about thirty-eight percent (from almost Y35,000 ($315)
to just under Y22,000 ($200)). 75 Third, the total amount of borrowing
transactions (kappu) is increasing rapidly (by eleven percent from
1994 to 1998).76 Moreover, the share of kappu among bank-affiliated
credit card transactions is growing with particular rapidity (by 127
77
percent from 1995 to 1999).
It would be imprudent to give dispositive weight to evidence of
a macroeconomic trend appearing over such a short period of
time-less than an entire economic cycle. And the changes themselves
are somewhat ambiguous: for example, the rate of borrowing is
increasing less rapidly than the rate of transactions, which could be
interpreted as evidence that borrowing is becoming less important. I
am inclined, however, to look at the data as evidence of an increased
rate of borrowing-particularly among bank-affiliated issuers, who are

73. See infra Part II.B (suggesting that telecommunications costs and economies of scale are
relevant in explaining levels of fraud and discount rates).
74. See BIS, 1999 PAYMENTS STATISTICS, supra note 63, at 61 tbl.12.
75. See id. at 62 tbl.13.
76. See JCCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 63, at 49-50 (comparing 1995 to 1999). For
comparison, the total amount of kappu from 1990 to 1994 actually decreased slightly, before
beginning to rise in 1994, as participation by bank affiliates in kappu transactions began to have
a significant effect on the market.
77. See id. Because revolving credit at that time still was the only form of kappu permitted
to bank-affiliated issuers, see supra note 64, all of those transactions must be revolving credit.
That trend seems to be continuing. One large Japanese bank-affiliated credit card issuer
reported an increase of the share of revolving credit value in its portfolio of 13.6% from 1998 to
1999 alone. See Anonymous Interview Four, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 17, 2000) [hereinafter
Anonymous Interview Four]. Another bank-affiliated issuer emphasized that revolving credit
usage is increasing among its younger card users in particular. See Anonymous Interview Six, in
Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Six].
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just now finally getting into the market. In any event, the significant
rates of change on all three parameters suggest that something has
happened during the last decade that has mitigated the force of
whatever factors have led to the striking differences between the
United States and Japanese credit card markets. To some degree, the
changes doubtless are attributable to the generally homogenizing
forces of globalization. 78 The most obvious candidate is the one
discussed above, the general opening of the revolving card market to
79
bank-affiliated issuers in 1992.
One way to look at the Japanese card market is to view it as
just starting to move beyond the payment cards that populated the
American market in the 1950s and 1960s. It is not a coincidence that
the credit card first introduced in Japan (in 1960)80 is said to have
been modeled directly on the American Express and Diner's Club
payment cards.8 1 With banks and their affiliates excluded for decades
from the revolving credit sector of the market, the industry has been
static for the most part since that time: the products available to
consumers have not been sufficiently attractive to produce the
consumer receptiveness to borrowing evident from the United States
transaction data.8 2 Thus, although Japanese banks (and their
affiliates) have a respectable market share of credit card transactions
78. For a general discussion of that point, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE
OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 83-92 (1999) (describing a "one size fits all"
"Golden Straitjacket" that forces all developed countries into a similar mode of economic
organization).
79. To be sure, the rates of change are quite slow, and borrowing is still less common on
cards issued by bank affiliates than it is on the credit cards of other consumer lenders. But that
slow growth seems fairly attributable to the complexity of experience involved in a successful
credit card operation, experience that it took decades for American and Japanese lenders to
acquire. See supra note 35. As the following pages make clear, the borrowing products available
from Japanese credit card lenders for the most part remain quite unattractive as compared to
the analogous products available from American credit card lenders.
80. See CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at 108.
81. See id.; Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 70.
82. The limited success of banks in the credit card system surely is related not only to the
particular limitations on credit card activities, but also in a general way to the limited attention
that banks in Japan have devoted to consumer finance. See STEPHEN M. HARNER, JAPAN'S
FINANCIAL REVOLUTION AND How AMERICAN FIRMS ARE PROFITING 37 (2000) ("[W]hile banks in
the United States quickly reoriented themselves to the consumer finance market when corporate
lending spreads narrowed, Japanese banks never made the transition."). Even now,
notwithstanding the financial pressures that have confronted the Japanese banking industry in
the late 1990s, it is not clear that Japanese banks have turned whole-heartedly to consumer
finance. See id. at 40-41, 126, 136. It is possible, of course, that the limited interest of banks in
consumer finance is attributable to the regulatory hurdles that in past decades hindered bank
participation in the industry (by preventing banks from issuing revolving credit cards). One
Japanese reader also suggested to me that Japanese banks continue to worry about adverse
reputational effects that they would suffer if they became involved in the vigorous collection
efforts and high interest rates that are typical of successful consumer lending.
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(about forty-nine percent of Japanese credit card shopping),8 3 their
share of borrowing transactions is much smaller: bank-affiliated
issuers had only fifteen percent of the extended borrowing ("kappu")
84
done by credit cards.
The most obvious explanation for those poor results is the
general lack of success of revolving credit,8 5 the product on which
American banks have built their large credit card receivables. At least
part of the answer must be the relatively unattractive features of that
product as it exists in Japan. Specifically, "revolving" credit in Japan
does not permit the freely chosen, month-to-month varying payments
typical of the American cardholder. Rather, the cardholder agrees, at
the time that the card is issued, that any transactions designated as
"revolving" will be paid back over a prearranged schedule (perhaps ten
percent per month, perhaps V10,000 per month).8 6 And the
designation of the transactions as revolving generally must occur at
the cash register-with an admission to the sales clerk that the
cardholder does not plan to pay for the purchase out of current
income.8 7 Many of my interviews suggested a practical explanation for
the cumbersome design; executives argued that it is much less
practical for the checkless Japanese cardholder to. make the oddamount monthly payments than it is for the American cardholder that
normally pays by check.8 8 Given the frequency with which Japanese
consumers pay other bills by means of bank transfers, that
explanation seems most implausible-there is no obvious reason they
could not pay credit card bills in the same way.8 9 But the plausibility
83. See JCCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 63, at 68. Retailers generally account for
another twenty-nine percent and shinpan kaisha for seventeen percent. See id.
84. See id. at 49-50.
85. See supra note 64 (reporting data indicating less than twelve percent of Japanese credit
card transactions involve extended borrowing).
86. See CREDIT TRANSACTION GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at 6493 (describing the typical
schedules for repayment of revolving credit from JCB); Anonymous Interview Three, supra note
70.
87. The distinction on that point from American practice seems crucial. See MANNING,
supra note 7, at 3 (discussing how the "magic of plastic" allows American consumers to "shelter
[themselves] from the social cost of borrowing").
88. See Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 77; Anonymous Interview Five, in Tokyo,
Japan (Oct. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Five].
89. Unlike American consumers, Japanese consumers easily can initiate bank transfers
directly from ATM machines or, for large payees like utility companies, even from convenience
stores. For statistics on the high use of bank transfers, see JAPANESE BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
supra note 13, at 3 (data indicating that bank transfers are used for eighty-five percent of
noncash payments in Japan). My sense that the explanation is implausible is bolstered by the
recent introduction of a conventional revolving credit product in Japan that does permit
consumers free choice of their monthly payment amounts. See infra notes 91-96 and
accompanying text.
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of the explanation is less important than the facts of the market: the
so-called revolving credit traditionally offered to Japanese consumers
is not nearly as convenient as the product available in the United
States.
Still, it is difficult to understand why the nonbank players in
the credit card industry have not stepped into the void to provide the
seductive products that American banks have designed to facilitate
the profitable extension of so much consumer credit in the United
States. It is clear that the major players are aware of the profitability
of revolving credit; most of them have simply failed in their efforts to
persuade their customers to use it.9 ° My best answer is the one
suggested above, that banks traditionally have been best placed to
develop credit card products that facilitate large amounts of
borrowing. The exclusion of banks from the Japanese market during
the period that those products were developed in the United
States--when depositary relations seemed to be crucial to successful
credit card issuance-stifled development of those products until the
last few years.
The plausibility of that analysis is bolstered by a significant
recent innovation in the Japanese credit card market: the 1999
introduction by at least one consumer finance company of a credit card
that offers the type of revolving credit that has been so successful in
the United States. 91 Such a card permits consumers to select their
repayment schedule not at the time of purchase, but at the end of each
billing cycle when they make a payment. 92 The identity of the
issuer-a consumer finance company not affiliated with any
depositary institution--suggests that the same developments in
information technology that foster successful credit card lending by

90. See KUREJITTO SANGYO HAKUSHO [WHITE PAPER ON CREDIT INDUSTRY], GEKKAN
SHOHISHA SHINYO [CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY], 2000-9, at 12, 14-15 [hereinafter CREDIT

INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER] (discussing efforts of banks to increase the amount of revolving credit).
I asked executives at more than one interview why-if they want their consumers to use
revolving credit-the default repayment option for Japanese credit cards is ikkai barai rather
than revolving credit. The most cogent explanation was that so many of their cardholders so
clearly want ikkai barai that they expected that they would face a serious adverse market
reaction if their cards had anything other than ikkai barai as the default repayment option. See
Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70.
91. See HARNER, supra note 82, at 135-36 (discussing such a card).
92. Some other issuers have used online connections to permit their customers an
intermediate degree of flexibility, under which customers that have selected ikkai barai at the
time of the transaction can go to the issuer's website and change the designation of any
particular transaction to revolving credit. See http://sumitomovisa.co.jp/carduse/atoribo.html
(Sumitomo Credit); http:/fhome3.americanexpress.com/japan/blue/flex/flexpay.html (American
Express). Although that might have much the same effect in theory, it is still cumbersome by
comparison to the typical American product.
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American monoline banks-with no depositary relations with their
93
customers-have paved the way to similar products in Japan.
As you would expect based on the American market experience,
the product was initially successful in attracting customers: the
company issued more than 500,000 cards in the first eighteen months
of the program (more than one-third of them to customers with no
previous relationship with the lender). 94 For present purposes, the
most important thing about the program is that those customers are
selecting revolving credit for a staggering (for Japan) ninety-one
percent of their purchases. 95 The company's underwriting appears to
rely heavily on a credit scoring model, an approach that seems to
resemble closely the models used by American issuers. 96 The use of
that technology is particularly surprising given the relatively limited
availability in the Japanese consumer finance industry of consumer
97
financial information.

93. See supra notes 36-41 (suggesting that depositary relations are irrelevant to the
successful marketing of modern credit card products); see also Naomi Tanaka, Toyota Cruises
into Consumer Finance,NIKKEI WKLY., Feb. 26, 2001, at 14 (discussing plans for Toyota to issue
a credit card starting in April 2001).
94. See Anonymous Interview One, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 11, 2000).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. It is difficult to understand exactly what kinds of information are available to consumer
lenders in Japan, but it is clear that general statistical use of the information is not as common
in Japan as it is in America. For example, the largest consumer credit reporting service in Japan
reports that as of 1998 it had less than seventy million entries and that it received less than
twenty million requests for information during 1998. See Personal Credit Information Center,
http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/pcic/pcicll.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2000). One likely reason for
the limited information is that lenders must have the customer's consent to submit information
to that center. See id. at http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/pcic/pcic05.htm.
Efforts to rely on the kind of credit scoring models that American card issuers use are
hampered by the limited willingness of the consumer lending industry as a whole to share
information. It appears that information traditionally has been shared only within each sector
(consumer finance companies, shinpan kaisha, and banks). Under that arrangement, the only
information that was shared industrywide was information about specific defaults. See id. at
http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/pcic/pcic08.htm. Plans for more complete sharing of information
are ongoing, as evidenced by the advent in late 2000 of a company that shares information
among a variety of consumer lenders (but not banks). See Kokyaku Shinyd Jydh6 12gatsu Kaiho
[Consumer Credit Reports of Consumer Credit Companies Will Be Open to Shinpan and Bankaffiliated Companies in December], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1;
http://www.teranet-corp.co.jp. On the other hand, the government may move to enact privacy
legislation that would restrict information sharing. See W.A. Lee, U.S. Banks Urged to Meet E. U.
Data Rules, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 2000, at 1 (reporting Japanese promulgation of a draft privacy
directive similar to the European directive), available at 2000 WL 25346343; Jy~h6 Tsashin
Senryaku Honbu [Committee on IT Strategy Headquarters], KOJIN JYOH KIHON HOSEI NI
KANSURU
TAIKO
[CONSULTING
REPORT
ON
PROTECTING
PRIVACY],
at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/it/pri-vacy/houseika/taikouan/1011taikou.
html (2000) (discussing
plans to enact Kojin Jy6h5 Kihonh6 [Law Regarding the Protection of Privacy]). Given the
relatively limited availability of information, it is impossible at this point to evaluate the
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All in all, the result is a market into which credit cards have
made relatively little headway and-which is much the same thing in
a retail economy Without checks-in which cash payment is unusually
dominant. Thus, from that perspective, it is easy to see why the
average credit card transaction in Japan is so much larger than the
average United States credit card transaction. If we assume that the
retail economies of the two countries have reasonably similar sets of
transactions of different sizes, and further assume that Japanese
credit cards are not-as a relative matter-as attractive to Japanese
consumers as American credit cards are to American consumers, then
we would expect to observe larger credit card transactions in Japan
than we do in the United States. Essentially, Japanese consumers are
much more willing to carry larger amounts of cash, which they use to
pay for larger transactions, than American consumers. American
consumers, on the other hand, are much more willing to use credit
cards for smaller transactions, for which Japanese consumers would
98
use cash.
In sum, the disempowered-bank hypothesis is consistent with
both the structure of the current market and the changes that seem to
be occurring in that market. That at least suggests that bank powers
are in some way causally related to that market. It remains to
examine other potential explanations.
b.

Merchant Size

The casual visitor to Japan finds that credit cards are readily
accepted at many of the places where they are accepted in the United
States: department stores, book stores, and other large retailers. But
it does seem clear that the credit card has a much less complete
penetration into the Japanese retail market than it does in the United
States. A consumer in the United States could incur almost all
ordinary living expenses on a credit card with relatively little
difficulty. In contrast, my impression is that it would be quite difficult
to subsist in Japan for any significant period of time without a source
of cash.99

effectiveness of that particular credit scoring model: if it is properly designed, it would be a bold
stroke of technological expertise; if not, it could be a cover that supports excessively risky
lending. Only the vagaries of a downturn in economic growth can provide a definitive
assessment.
98. Cf. supra note 16 (discussing survey results regarding the amount of cash typically
carried by Japanese).
99. Despite considerable effort, I have been unable to locate any data on this point. I rely
with some reluctance on my own experience living in Tokyo, on conversations with colleagues
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Although I have no data to support a firm connection, it is
plausible that this is related to the relatively small size of Japanese
retailers. 10 0 Historically, Japan protected small retailers through a
complex web of formal and informal constraints that limited
competition among retailers so as to limit their growth and
consolidation. 101
Those constraints degraded in a substantial way only in the
early 1990s, permitting the rise of large chain stores and the
consolidation of retailers that are making the Japanese retail market
look increasingly like the American retail market. 10 2 As explained in
Part I, the increasing size of. retailers generally should enhance the
attractiveness of credit cards to retailers by lowering the significance
of the fixed costs of credit card acceptance. Most importantly, from my
point of view, the consolidation occurred at about the same time as
bank affiliates were permitted entry into the revolving credit market.
Thus, it is at least possible that the increasing prevalence of larger
retailers has supported an increase in the share of the retail market in
which credit cards are accepted, which would help explain the
observed increase in the number and volume of transactions.
c.
i.

Other Explanations
Cautious Consumers

The most obvious alternative explanation is the simplest, but
also the least satisfying: Japanese cardholders by nature are more
cautious and averse to borrowing than American consumers. Thus,
one might think that it is natural that they should use credit less.
That habit could be connected to the substantial literature attempting
to explain what seems to be the Japanese consumer's higher

who have visited Japan for extended stays, and on the views of credit card-carrying friends from
Japan.
100. Another possibility (suggested to me by Rick Lempert) is that American retailers that
take credit cards gain to the extent credit cards substitute for checks because of the expenses
they incur collecting bad checks. Japanese retailers-who do not take checks-do not have that
additional incentive to accept credit cards.
101. See generally Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in
Comparative and International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396, 404-25 (1997)
(discussing the complex alliances among Japanese interest groups that finally led to the
introduction of foreign competition and chain retail stores); Frank Upham, Privatizing
Regulation: The Implementation of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, in POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 264 (Gary D. Allinson & Yasunori Sone eds., 1993) (same).
102. 1 thank Mark West for this point.
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predilection to save. 10 3 From that perspective, the other side of a
higher predilection for savings would be a lower tendency to use
consumer credit. That tendency also might be supported by the
historically ungenerous provisions of the Japanese consumer
bankruptcy system (which might deter consumer borrowing) or by the
relatively undeveloped credit bureau system 104 (which might deter
consumer lending).
That theory has several salient empirical difficulties. The first
is the empirical fact that the size of the Japanese consumer credit
market does not in fact suggest that Japanese consumers have a
higher aversion to borrowing than American consumers. Indeed, if
anything, the Japanese consumer credit market is slightly larger per
capita than the American consumer credit market. The American
consumer credit market (excluding home mortgages) is now in the
range of $1.2 trillion (about $4,400 per capita). 10 5 The Japanese
market (again excluding home mortgages) seems to be about Y73
trillion (about $5,300 per person).10 6 Thus, although it seems plausible
that there are distinctively Japanese cultural constraints on consumer
borrowing, it is difficult to believe that those constraints are more
10 7
powerful than the analogous American constraints.
Looking to the legal system, one might suppose that the
perceived leniency of the American consumer bankruptcy system
fosters greater credit card borrowing. One problem is that it is difficult
to discern any cognizable way in which the Japanese consumer

103. The American rate for some time hovered around ten percent, but in recent years has
sunk quite low, arguably near zero. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 31, 100, 321 n.1, 337 n.3
(reporting a net savings rate during 1998 of 0.5%). Data from different sources report widely
varying rates of savings in Japan. Compare Yoshikazu Yada & Haruki Hirano, Statistics on
Personal Savings Tell Half the Story: Despite Statistics, Most People Aren't that Rich, ASAHI
SHIMBUN, Aug. 10, 2000 (reporting that Japanese working households save about 28.5% of their
income
(up
from
20.9%
in
1983)),
available
at
http://www.asahi.com/english/asahi/0810/asahi081002.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2000), with
Sheldon Garon, Fashioning a Culture of Thrift: Promoting Saving in Twentieth-Century Japan
(2000) (unpublished manuscript) (reporting that the Japanese rate has leveled off around
thirteen percent), available at http://www.iar.-ubc.ca/centres/cjr/sac2000/garon.pdf. All reports
indicate, however, that the rate is higher in Japan than it is in the United States.
104. See supra note 97 (discussing the credit bureau system).
105. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19 (Consumer Credit) (Jan. 8, 2001), at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/Current/gl9.pdf; SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK,
supra note 6, at 258.
106. JCCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 63, at 30; see also Alexander, supra note 35
(presenting data illustrating that Japan since 1990 has had a higher ratio of consumer credit to
disposable income than the United States).
107. It is not as though American culture venerates those who rely on borrowing to support
spending beyond their income. See MANNING, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the condemnation of
excessive borrowing as part of the "nonmonetary price of debt").
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bankruptcy system is harsher than the American system.10 8 As a
practical matter, Japanese consumer bankruptcy grants a discharge in
a relatively routine manner. Moreover, whatever the social stigma of
bankruptcy might be, resistance to bankruptcy seems to be falling in
Japan, where about one-tenth of one percent of the populace filed for
bankruptcy in 1999.109 Although that is still much lower than the
American rate of about one-half of one percent, it has been growing
over the last decade so rapidly that it is difficult to be sure that the
0
difference means much."
More generally, the basic problem in postulating a cultural
connection between a predilection to save and an aversion to borrow is
that statistics about the savings rate-the ratio of overall savings to
overall consumption-have no necessary relation to the number of
people who borrow or to the amount that they borrow. Thus, it would
be entirely possible for Japan to have a higher savings rate than the
United States because a higher percentage of its people save more, but
at the same time to have a similar (or greater) amount of consumer
credit per capita. That could be true, for example, if either a higher
percentage of Japanese nonsavers than American nonsavers use
consumer credit or those Japanese nonsavers who do use consumer
credit use (on the average) more than the borrowers in the United
States. I have not located any data that is sufficiently specific to
describe the pattern precisely, but for purposes of my topic the
generally similar amounts of consumer borrowing per capita make me
skeptical of any heavy reliance on a Japanese aversion to borrowing.
That empirical evidence is bolstered by the theoretical
literature attempting to explain the differing levels of savings in the
United States and Japan. Although some scholars do think that the
higher savings rate reflects a special aspect of the Japanese
personality,"' others attribute it to other institutional features of the
108. For information on the Japanese consumer bankruptcy system, I am grateful to
Professor Kent Anderson at Hokkaido University.
109. I base that estimate on data collected by Kent Anderson from the Supreme Court of
Japan. See e-mail from Kent Anderson, Associate Professor, Hokkaido University, School of Law
(Feb. 16, 2001) (copy on file with author) (reporting 124,000 consumer bankruptcies in Japan in
1999, after a more than ten-fold increase during the 1990s).
110. See News Release, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Bankruptcy
Filings Down in Calendar Year (Feb. 23, 2001) (on file with author) (reporting 1.2 million
personal bankruptcies in the United States during 2000); Nicole Duran, Consumers Slam
Bankruptcy Bill, AM. BANKER, Feb. 28, 2001, at 4 (same), available at 2001 WL 3909819. The
American rate also has been dropping for the last few years, which further undermines any effort
to put great significance in the difference between that rate and the Japanese rate.
111. This scholarship does not necessarily implicate a native aspect of the personality. See
SHELDON GARON, THE STATE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 153-57, 171-77 (1997) (discussing government
efforts to popularize thrift and savings in Japan after World War II); see generally Sheldon
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Japanese economy. For example, some scholars think the higher rate
of savings is caused by the Japanese system for intergenerational
transfers of wealth, 112 while others view it (even now) as an artifact of
Japan's stage of industrial development. 113 Although those
explanations would explain a lower rate of consumer spending, they
provide much less direct support for the lower rate of consumer
borrowing that appears in the credit card market. Specifically, they
provide little support for the specific observation in question: a lower
rate of borrowing in those transactions in which consumers choose to
purchase by credit card.
Thus, notwithstanding the strong evidence that Japanese
consumers save more than American consumers, my general
impression is that the consumer credit market as a whole is
approximately as attractive to consumers as the analogous market in
the United States. The culture of each country includes strands that
strongly condemn excessive borrowing, but in each country the
consumer credit industry in the last few decades has broken through
those constraints to create about $5000 per person in borrowing.
While a good deal of work has been done to explain how that was
accomplished in the United States, 114 I am not aware of similar
scholarship explaining the inconsistency between the widely noted
Japanese aversion to borrowing and the statistics showing an
American-style level of consumer debt. But, whatever the cause, it is
apparent that there is a great deal of consumer credit in Japan; it is
the second largest consumer credit market in the world. To be sure,
little of it comes from credit card lending. Rather, it comes from a
collection of consumer lenders such as shinpan kaisha (which
generally finance purchases of consumer products) and other
consumer finance companies (ranging from large and reputable
Garon, Luxury Is the Enemy: Mobilizing Savings and PopularizingThrift in Wartime Japan, 26
J. JAPANESE STUD. 41 (2000) (discussing government efforts to popularize thrift and savings in
Japan during World War II); Garon, supra note 103 (arguing that high Japanese savings rates
are caused by more than a century of vigorous government efforts to inculcate a "culture of
thrift"); Charles Yuji Horioka, Comments on Fashioning a Culture of Thrift: Promoting Savings
in Japan and the World (2000) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author) (discussing
empirical research indicating that savings education alters the habits of those subjected to it).
112. For a thorough but ultimately inconclusive attempt to explain that phenomenon, see
FUMIO HAYASHI, UNDERSTANDING SAVINGS ch. 11 (1997).

113. Richard Katz argues that consumers in the aggregate save more at earlier stages of
development and thus that the post-World War II data suggesting higher savings by Japanese
consumers is caused by Japan's position at an earlier stage in the development process during
those years. See KATZ, supra note 48, at 141-42, 199-206.
114. See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 7, at 101-24 (discussing the "cognitive connect" between
income and current spending, and how its force diminished during the passage of the twentieth
century).
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companies, such as Takefuji and Acom, to smaller less-reputable
"sarakin" (literally "salaryman finance")). 115 Thus, the question
remains why, within that market, do consumers use credit cards for
such a small share of borrowing. As I explain above, I think that
institutional factors peculiar to the Japanese market provide a
plausible answer to that question.
ii. Limited Consumer Protection Laws
Another possibility is that the limited success of the credit card
derives from the relatively limited protection Japanese law provides
Japanese credit cardholders. Most obviously, Japan has no analogue
to section 170 of the Truth-in-Lending Act ("TILA"), 116 which generally
preserves the right of American cardholders to present against the
issuer any defense to payment that they would have against the
merchant. 17 The parallel Japanese statute at first glance seems to
provide the same protection, but it is limited to transactions that
involve extended borrowing (kappu).1 1 8 Because those transactions are
a relatively small share of the Japanese credit card industry,11 9 that
provision has little impact. For comparison, notice that the TILA
provision applies until the bill is repaid, even if it happens that the
bill is paid during the first billing cycle. 120 . Because those laws are
much less protective than American laws, Japanese consumers might
fear losses that they would incur if they carry or use credit cards.
Again, because there has been no significant change in those
laws in the last decade, the legal differences cannot explain the
observed pattern. 12' More broadly, however, my impressions based
upon American experience with such protections make me doubt that
the difference in formal legal rules can have much significance. In the
United States, we see that American consumers are so unfamiliar
115. See generally HARNER, supra note 82, at 126-37 (discussing consumer lending in Japan).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (2000).
117. See generally MANN, supra note 2, at 125-36 (discussing those protections).
118. Kappu hanbaih5 [Installment sales law], Law No. 159 of 1961, arts. 30-4 & 30-5; see
supra note 64 (discussing the definition of "kappu").
119. See JCCIA ANNUAL STATISTICS, supra note 63, at 64 (reporting about 12.7% of 1998
transaction value).
120. See § 1666i(A); MANN, supra note 2, at 118 (discussing that aspect of TILA).
121. For minor revisions in 1999, see H5mon hanbai t5 ni kansuru h~ritsu oyobi kappu
hanbaih5 no ichibu wo kaisei suru h5ritsu [Law amending door-to-door and other direct sales law
and installment sales law], Law No. 34 of 1999 (broadening the coverage of the protection in
minor respects); Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Outline of Amendment to Door-toDoor Sales and Other Direct Sales Law and Installment Sales Law (Draft) (Mar. 4, 1999)
(describing the purpose of the revisions), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/datagCD 1101e.html.
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with the protection that it is unlikely to be a significant motivation in
122
their willingness to use credit cards.

To summarize, it may be that some part of the difference in the
use of credit in credit card transactions arises from a Japanese
"distaste" for borrowing, but those factors cannot explain the changes
in the market that have occurred during recent years. Those changes
are best explained by changes in the institutional framework within
which the card has developed and in which it is used.
B. The Costs of the System
The previous section contends that the Japanese credit card
industry looks so different from the United States industry because of
institutional factors that made it more difficult for financial
institutions and merchants to participate in the Japanese credit card
market than in its United States counterpart. This section argues that
the system has also been hindered in a subsidiary way by higher costs,
which make the system less attractive to the merchants and
cardholders that bear a significant portion of those costs. The most
obvious source of those costs is in the losses from fraud, which are
significantly higher in Japan than they are in the United States. The
most obvious evidence of the significance of those costs would be in the
higher discount rates and cardholder fees charged in the Japanese
system. This section considers those topics in turn.
1.

Fraud Rates

Surely one of the most important metrics of the effectiveness of
a payment system is reliability: How well does it prevent fraud
(transactions that are on stolen cards or otherwise not authorized by
the cardholder)? On that point, the raw data suggests that Japan has
a problem. Specifically, the fraud rate in the United States is in the
range of 0.06 percent to 0.07 percent (six or seven cents per $100).123
122. See Telephone Interview with Michael Butts, CreditCard.com (Oct. 15, 1999) (transcript
at 1) (transcript on file with author) (discussing rarity of claims under section 170 of TILA);
Telephone Interview with Steven Klebe, Vice President, Payment Industry Alliances,
CyberSource Corp. (Oct. 19, 1999) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Klebe Interview]
(same).
123. See Card Fraud in the U.S.-1999, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA),
June 2000, Issue 718, at 1, 4 [hereinafter 1999 U.S. Fraud Data] (reporting a rate of 0.06% for
1999). I have not seen final data for 2000, but news reports suggest that the rate for 2000 rose

2002]

CREDIT CARDS AND DEBIT CARDS

1089

In Japan, by contrast, the fraud rate is much higher, about 0.14%.124
Looking specifically to losses from forged cards, the Japanese rate of
about 6.2 basis points is about five times the American rate of 1.3
125
basis points.
One possibility that initially seemed attractive was that the
high fraud rate is associated with the diminished statutory incentive
for Japanese card issuers to prevent unauthorized transactions. In
addition to the protection mentioned above with respect to defective
purchases, 126 the Truth-in-Lending Act also prevents American issuers
from shifting the risk of unauthorized transactions to their
Cardholders; 27 Japanese law includes no such rule. 28 At first glance,
then, one might think that the difference in formal legal treatment
could lead to a lower level of care by the card issuer. 29 On reflection,
however, that explanation does not seem plausible. For one thing,
Japanese issuers in practice retain the risk of unauthorized
transactions because they purchase insurance for much of that risk
and voluntarily cover most of the losses that the insurance does not

slightly to 0.07%. See David Breitkopf, Warped Plastic? New Card Reader Irons Out Problem,
AM. BANKER, July 16, 2001, at 8 (explaining that Visa's fraud rate had fallen to 0.07% in 2000),
available at 2001 WL 3912819. Indeed, interim data suggests that the rate in the United States
has continued to rise, to approximately 0.09% for the first half of 2001. See U.S. Fraud
Losses/Gross Volume:
Monthly
Average-Current, at
http://www.cardweb.comcarddata/charts/fraud.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2001).
124. See Kurejitto Kd-do Fusei Shiy6 Higai no Hassei Jy~kyd [Statistics on Losses from
Unauthorized Credit Card Transactions in Japan], CARDWAVE, 2001-10, at 10-11 [hereinafter
Japanese Credit Card Fraud Data]. That rate is calculated based on Y21.58 trillion of
transactions for 2000. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
125. The Japanese rate is calculated based on Y9 billion of forged credit card losses, divided
by the total Y21.58 trillion of transactions for 2000. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
The American rate is calculated from 1999 US FraudData, supra note 123, at 4, including losses
from skimming, altered cards, and new counterfeit cards.
126. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
127. Truth-in-Lending Act § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2000). That statute permits issuers to
impose fifty dollars of liability on cardholders, but Visa and MasterCard both have generally
agreed that their issuers will waive the right to pass that loss to the cardholders. See Lisa
Fickenscher, Visa Shores Up Web Position, Ends Fees on Theft of Card Numbers, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 22, 2000, at 1 (describing Visa's new policy, which does not require customers to pay a fifty
dollar
fee),
available at 2000
WL
3359755;
MasterCard,
Zero Liability, at
http://www.mastercard.com/general/zero-liability.html (last visited May 8, 2002) (summarizing
MasterCard policy); see also RITZER, supra note 37, at 101 ("[Clredit card companies rarely
assess a fraud victim for even that sum [i.e., the $50 permitted by the Truth-in-Lending Act].").
128. See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70; Anonymous Interview Three, supra note
70; Anonymous Interview Six, supra note 77.
129. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment
Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996) (discussing the effects of increased liability for issuers and
consumers).
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cover.' 30 Because they purchase that insurance from third-party
insurers, 131 it is fair to expect that the rates that they pay in the long
run are affected substantially by their performance. Thus, it is at least
plausible to think that Japanese card issuers have a significant
incentive to reduce fraud losses.
Moreover, it is clear that the fraud rates in both countries are
not stable, as you would expect if the rates were associated with
longstanding differences in the legal framework. In the United States,
for example, the fraud rate has fallen by more than half in the last
decade. 132 Similarly, the fraud problem in Japan is relatively recent;
fraud losses in 2000 were forty-three percent higher than they were
just two years earlier in 1998, with sixty-four percent of.the increase
3
attributable to losses from forged cards.'1
The more likely cause of the losses is exploitation of technical
vulnerabilities in the Japanese system. 3 4 Most obviously, the

130. To be sure, the third-party insurance does not cover all types of unauthorized
transactions. See Takayoshi Suefuji, Kurejitto Kddo Nyamon [Introduction to Credit Cards],
GEKKAN SHOHISHA SHINYO [CONSUMER CREDIT MONTHLY], 2000-8, at 74, 75 (describing
insurance limited to theft and loss of the card). Moreover, it is limited to unauthorized
transactions that occur no more than sixty days before, and no more than sixty days after, the
cardholder advises the issuer of the loss. See id. It is possible that a few losses occur outside that
window, especially if cardholders fail to examine their statements. Like the fifty dollar limit
discussed supra note 127, however, those limitations seem to be widely ignored. Specifically, my
interviews strongly suggest that issuers commonly cover losses whether the losses are covered by
the insurance or not. The sole exception seems to be in cases in which the cardholder was
seriously negligent in losing the card; even that possibility seems not to be commonly applied.
See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70; Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 70;
Anonymous Interview Six, supra note 77. It appears that the issuers' common willingness to
cover transactions without regard to the precise boundaries of the insurance coverage is related
at least in part to administrative guidance from MITI, which has suggested to credit card issuers
that the formal terms of the typical insurance policies do not provide adequate protection to
consumers. MINISTRY OF INT'L TRADE & INDUSTRY, KADO NO ANZENSEI NO KAKUHO NI TSUITE [To
Ensure the Security of Credit Cards] (July 21, 1979) (guidance sent to the JCCIA).
131. The issuers normally purchase the insurance from third-party providers, but sometimes
they self-insure. See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70; Anonymous Interview Three,
supra note 70.
132. See 1999 U.S. FraudData, supra note 123, at 1 (reporting drop in fraud losses from 16.1
cents to 6.0 cents per $100).
133. See Japanese Credit Card Fraud Data,supra note 124, at 12.
134. The Japanese government apparently attributes the fraud losses to lax criminal laws
and is responding in several ways. See Keih5 no ichibu wo kaisei suru hbritsu [Law amending
penal code], Law No. 97 of 2001 (effective July 24, 2001) (criminalizing the theft of data to forge
cards as well as manufacturing, possessing or using forged cards); Govt to Crack down on Credit
Card Crimes, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, June 16, 2000 (reporting plans to criminalize skimming
and the possession of forged cards); Lax Laws Make Japan Card-ForgeryHaven, NIKKEI WKLY.,
Apr. 24, 2000, at 4 (same); NPA Targets Credit Card Fraud,JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 6, 2000
(reporting plans for the National Police Agency to develop a system for analyzing fake credit
cards
to
identify
and
locate
professional
card
counterfeiters),
available at
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Japanese system uses contemporaneous telephone authorizations
much less frequently than the American system, 135 apparently
136
because of the relatively high cost of Japanese telecommunications.
Without those authorizations, the potential for fraud is much higher
because the system has no practical way to identify a card that bears a
valid number, even if the magnetic stripe fails to include the
17
information that would appear on a legitimate card.
But it is most implausible to regard that difficulty as a
permanent feature of the system. It is unlikely that Japanese issuers
and merchants will tolerate for long substantial losses from fraud that
easily could be eradicated by simple authorization procedures that are
standard operating practice in the United States. Thus, it is not
surprising that the industry already is implementing responses that
target that problem: industry sources explain that as of late 2000 or

http://www.newsonjapan.com. As the discussion in the text suggests, I am skeptical of the
significance of those legal problems.
135. See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70. The details about the use of
contemporaneous authorizations are difficult to discern, because I received directly inconsistent
explanations in several of my interviews. Those explanations convince me, at a minimum, that
contemporaneous authorizations are not as ubiquitous in Japan as they are in the United States.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (reporting ninety-five percent authorization rates for
United States transactions). As a rule of thumb, it appears that until very recently many
merchants were not doing contemporaneous online authorizations for transactions below
Y10,000 (about ninety dollars). See Anonymous Interview One, supra note 94; Anonymous
Interview Two, supra note 70; Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 88; Anonymous Interview
Five, supra note 88. That V10,000 limit itself was implemented only in 1999, before which that
floor had been V30,000. Moreover, for several categories of merchants (such as hotels, airports,
and hospitals), the floors historically have been much higher, in the range of Y180,000-300,000
(about $170o$270). See id. One large issuer told me that about thirty percent of its transactions
are not authorized because they fall below the floors. Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 88.
136. Those high costs contribute to the high floors by making it difficult to persuade
merchants to accept the costs of more frequent authorizations associated with lower floors.
Although my interviews produced conflicting views on the point, more than one source argued
that high telecommunication costs also contribute to a persistent merchant practice of failing to
authorize transactions above the floors. The normal mechanism of forcing merchants to engage
in particular procedures is a contract under which the merchant is protected from losses for
unauthorized transactions only if it follows the contractually required procedures. Thus, if the
agreement requires telephonic authorization, the merchant omits that authorization at the cost
of accepting the risk that the transaction is fraudulent. The interviews attribute merchant
noncompliance to the (not entirely implausible) view of the merchant that the cost of the
authorization exceeds the potential fraud savings from the authorization. Anonymous Interview
Four, supra note 88; Anonymous Interview Seven, in Tokyo, Japan (Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter
Anonymous Interview Seven]. For example, if the telephone call costs ten yen on a Y10,000
transaction, it would make sense to call only if the likelihood of fraud was 0.10 percent, just
slightly less than the typical Japanese fraud rate of 0.14 percent. See supra note 124. Thus, it
would be rational for the merchant to decline to call in any transaction in which the merchant
thought that the likelihood of fraud was significantly less than is typical.
137. See MANN, supra note 2, at 113-14 (discussing the importance of contemporaneous
transaction authorization).
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2001 most department stores 138 and hotels in Japan will process

transactions without any floor at all-seeking online authorizations
for all transactions regardless of size. 139 Another response that seems
to be appearing in the market already is an increasing tendency for
large store-related issuers to adopt the Visa and MasterCard
brands.1 40 Use of those brands gives the issuers access to all of the
141
antifraud technology that has been effective in the United States.
But advances in antifraud technology cannot solve the problem
entirely. Even contemporaneous authorizations are to some degree
vulnerable to sophisticated cards created by "skimmers" (who obtain
not only the card account number, but also the other information on
the magnetic stripe of the legitimate card). 142 The only existing
defense against those cards is the relatively vulnerable capacity of
issuer-based expert computer systems to detect questionable patterns

138. The rapid change is evident from anecdotal discussions of department stores in my
interviews. Several different interview subjects reported to me the view that the rise in fraud
was attributable generally to the vulnerability of Japanese department stores, specifically to
their general failure to conduct sufficiently frequent telephone authorizations. Many observers
believe that organized crime targeted department stores because of that vulnerability. The most
reliable data I have found, however, suggests that department stores during 2000 in fact were
relatively impervious to fraud. That data suggests that department store transactions accounted
for less than ten percent of 1999 fraud, although those transactions generally are twenty to
twenty-five percent of volume. If there is a problem sector, it clearly is the electronics shop,
which accounted for about twenty-one percent of 2000 fraud. See Japanese Credit Card Fraud
Data, supra note 124, at 10-11; see also Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 88 (discussing
report by card issuer that fraud is significantly more common in its electronic-store transactions
than in its department-store transactions); Anonymous Interview Five, supra note 88 (suggesting
that problems with department stores are being solved). Smaller, but less tractable, problems are
in the gasoline and highway-toll sectors, for which it is not thought economically practicable to
have authorization terminals at each payment location. See Anonymous Interview Six, supra
note 130 (discussing problems at gasoline stations and highway-toll facilities); Anonymous
Interview Four, supra note 88 (reporting that ten percent of fraud in one large credit card
portfolio occurs at gasoline stations).
139. See Anonymous Interview Seven, supra note 136.
140. See Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 70. My particular emphasis on the activity
of department stores is supported by brochures that I collected from department stores in Tokyo
in the fall of 2000. Those brochures included, among others, Credit Saison (the largest storerelated card issuer in Japan and the third largest issuer overall) and Mitsukoshi, one of the
oldest and most prestigious Japanese department stores. Although it would have been valuable
to my research, I was unable to interview a card executive at a Japanese department store.
141. For example, my anecdotal impression (based on examining cards while I have been in
Japan) is that many cards issued by indigenous Japanese issuers do not include the indented
printing and multicolor signature tape that hinder forgery of standard Visa and MasterCard
products. Japanese-issued Visa and MasterCard products in those respects are (at least to the
naked eye) indistinguishable from the American products.
142. See, e.g., Jay Lyman, Newly Discovered Bug 'Skims' Credit Card Data, NEWS FACTOR
NETWORK, June 22, 2001 (discussing the discovery in Hong Kong card payment terminals of
"skimmer bugs"), available at http://www.newsfactor.comJperl/printer/11494 (last visited Feb. 7,
2002).
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in the usage of cards.' 43 And to some degree Japan's high fraud rate is
caused by two unfortunate features that make it a likely target for
such attacks: the high telecommunication costs that continue to deter
merchants from consistent authorization of transactions 144 and its
proximity to the locations where the most sophisticated card forgers
seem to reside. 145 To the extent those features are ineradicable, the
Japanese credit card industry will continue to endure fraud losses
somewhat higher than those in the United States.
2.

Discount Rates and Cardholder Fees

Although the issuer nominally bears the losses from
unauthorized transactions in ordinary retail credit card transactions,
the amount of those losses ineluctably affects the costs that the
cardholders and merchants pay, because they affect the prices that the
system 14 6 must charge in the form of cardholder fees and discount
fees 47 in order to remain profitable. Hence, it is natural to expect that
the higher losses from fraud discussed in the previous section would
lead to higher charges to merchants and cardholders. Those are
particularly important to the success of the system, because they
directly influence the willingness of consumers to obtain the cards and
of merchants to accept the cards.
Thus, it is no surprise that the objective costs of the Japanese
system seem to be significantly higher than those in the United
States. First, the charges to cardholders, although no more uniform
than in the United States, seem to be substantially higher. Charges in
143. See MANN, supra note 2, at 111-12. But cf. David Breitkopf, MasterCard Tests Device
that 'Hears'Cloned Cards,AM. BANKER, Mar. 7, 2001, at 6 (discussing an antifraud system that
would recognize counterfeit cards based on unique fingerprint-like characteristics of each
magnetic stripe, which produce detectably different sounds when the cards are swiped), available
at 2001 WL 3909986.
144. See supranote 136 (discussing that problem).
145. Card forgery of a type that will succeed in the face of modern telephone authorization
requires relatively sophisticated fabrication facilities. Without identifying particular countries
mentioned in my interviews, it appears that several of the countries that tolerate such facilities
are located relatively close to Japan. See RITZER, supra note 37, at 88 (suggesting that Hong
Kong was a prime location for those facilities in the early 1990s). For those facilities, the easy
international transportation connections into Japan and the luxury goods available in Japanese
department and electronics stores offer a natural target. See Anonymous Interview Seven, supra
note 136.
146. A closed-loop issuer like American Express contracts directly with both cardholders and
merchants that accept the card. In an open-loop system like Visa, an issuing bank charges fees to
cardholders and an acquiring or merchant bank charges discount fees to merchants. It is typical
for the acquiring bank to pass a set portion of the discount fee to the issuing bank in the form of
an interchange fee. See MANN, supra note 2, at 115-16.
147. The discount fee is the fee that the merchant pays to its acquiring bank for each credit
card transaction. See id.
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the United States are relatively low both because cards with no
annual fees are quite common and because the frequent use of the
card makes the fee per transaction very low (probably only a few
pennies at most). 148 In Japan, by contrast, the fees seem to be much
higher-cards with no annual fee seem to be particularly
uncommon-and the lower number of transactions per card makes the
cost per transaction even higher.149
Because of the wide variations in cardholder fees, my
information on that topic is not particularly firm. The differences in
the charges to merchants are obvious, however, and widely known
within the industry.1 50 For the Visa and MasterCard credit card
systems that dominate the United States market, the discount fee
varies widely depending on the type of merchant, but normally ranges
between one-and-one-half to five percent, with most merchants
seeming to pay something less than two percent. The discount fee for
American Express (the largest competitor) is quite a bit higher, about
2.75%.151 Although it is difficult to get specific information, the
discount rates in Japan seem to be somewhat higher. Published
sources suggest that rates often are above five percent, 52 but in fact
rates seem to be quite a bit lower. Based on my interviews, my
impression is that a typical rate is more commonly in the vicinity of
three to three-and-a-half percent.
That difference seems much too large to be explained solely by
the difference in fraud rates: the rate of fraud losses in Japan exceeds

148. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 165 (illustrating that American credit
card issuers derive only two percent of their income from annual fees); supra note 4 and
accompanying text (discussing the relative frequency of American card use).
149. See HARNER, supra note 82, at 132-33 (reporting data indicating that, excluding revenue
from cashing commissions, twenty-six percent of credit card industry revenue (thirty-seven
percent of bank-affiliated issuer revenue) is from card members' fees). (I exclude revenue from
cashing commissions because my purpose is to study the profitability of credit cards as a
payment mechanism. I also exclude the much smaller share of cashing fees from the analogous
statistics about American credit card issuers.) Based on credit card brochures that I collected
during my stay in Japan, I estimate that a typical annual fee is in the range of Y1,500 (a little
less than fifteen dollars).
150. Given their importance to the system, it is surprising that there is no official data from
the United States or Japan regarding the size of the charges that merchants pay. Thus, I rely
entirely on reports from secondary sources and from interviews. Because the information has
great competitive value, it is highly proprietary. Accordingly, much of the information in the
succeeding paragraphs is not attributed to particular sources.
151. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 169-72 (discussing American Express
merchant discount fees).
152. See Debit Cards Getting Ready for Big Time, NIKKEI WKLY., Feb. 28, 2000, at 15
[hereinafter Debit Cards Getting Ready] (reporting credit card discount rates of three to seven
percent); Makoto Sato, Would-Be Net Banks Jockey for Position, NIKKEI WKLY., May 8, 2000, at
12 (reporting discount rates of over five percent).
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the United States rate by less than one-tenth of one percent of the
gross amount of transactions, 15 3 which hardly could justify a discount
rate more than one percent higher. A much more persuasive
explanation for the higher discount fees is the paucity of credit
transactions. In the United States, credit card issuers rely heavily on
revenue from interest that their cardholders pay on borrowed funds.
Thus, they can operate profitably with a relatively smaller reliance on
revenue from the merchant. 154 For example, credit card issuers in the
United States derive 88% of their revenues from finance charges
(including late fees), and only 10% from interchange fees. 155 In Japan,
revenues from interest are a relatively small portion of the revenues of
the card issuer, about 23% over the industry as a whole, but only 14%
of the revenues of bank-affiliated card issuers who have only recently
been permitted to extend revolving credit.156 Thus, the issuer's
operations can be profitable only if it obtains a relatively higher share
of revenue from the merchant and the cardholder. In Japan, those fees
amount to 77% of all industry revenues, but 86% of the revenues of
bank-affiliated issuers. 5 7 And in fact the apparent discount rates of 34% are not out of line if they are compared to the rates that American
Express charges for its payment card rather than the rates Visa and
MasterCard charge for their credit cards. 58 Because American
Express faces the same lack of interest income that Japanese issuers
do, its discount rates provide a more appropriate benchmark for
comparison.

153. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing fraud rates of thirteen basis
points in Japan and six in the United States).
154. The issuer typically obtains those revenues indirectly through an interchange fee paid
by the bank that acquires the transaction from the merchant. The acquiring bank pays the fee
out of the (presumably larger) discount that the merchant pays to the acquiring bank. See supra
note 147. For economic analyses of the reasons for those fees, see Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P.
King, The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems (July 9, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com; Richard Schmalensee, Payment Systems and
Interchange Fees (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://www.ssrn.com.
155. See EvANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 165.
156. See HARNER, supra note 82, at 132-33.
157. See id. Thus, the overall revenue model closely resembles American Express, which
obtains only 15% of its revenues from finance charges (late fees), but derives 85% of its revenues
from charges to users (66% from the charges it imposes on merchants and 19% from card fees).
See EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 165. Indeed, the most prominent difference is that
Japanese bank-affiliated credit card issuers impose a smaller share of their user charges on the
merchants (57%) than American Express (78%). (The shares are calculated from the data for
Japanese issuers in HARNER, supra note 82, at 132-33, and from the data for American Express
in EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 165.)
158. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing American Express discount fees).
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Table 2
Sources of Revenue of United States and
159
Japanese Credit Card Issuers

Visa &
MasterCard

American
Express

(UnitedStates)

All Card
IAffiliated
(Japan)
(Japan)

BankIssuers
(Japan)

Typical
Discount
Rate

1.8%

2.75%

3%

3%

Interest

88%

15%

23%

14%

Merchant/
Interchange
Fees

10%

66%

51%

49%

Card Fees

2%

19%

26%

37%

To be sure, the discount rates do appear to be cognizably higher
than those that American Express charges in the United States. But
several structural explanations make that slight difference readily
understandable. Most obviously, a merchant's selection of an acquirer
in the United States occurs in a relatively competitive market
characterized by a small number of clearing networks with a large
number of potential acquirers in each network. Thus, in the United
States, a typical merchant can gain access to the Visa and MasterCard
systems from any of literally dozens of banks, as well as a large
number of sophisticated third-party acquirers. First Data surely has a
dominating share of the market (more than forty percent), but there
are such a large number of competitors of significant size that the
market is relatively competitive, 160 in the sense that there is extensive
intrabrand competition, notwithstanding the limited interbrand
competition. 161 And even if American Express is the only way for a
159. The table is based on information from the sources identified at supra note 157.
160. The market shares drop off rapidly after First Data: the second largest acquirer,
National Processing, has a thirteen percent share. But the number of significant players is
impressive. In 1999 the top eighty-seven companies processed more than one million dollars of
transactions per week. See 1999 U.S. Acquisition Data, supra note 50, at 9.
161. My sanguine views about the competitiveness of the industry are in some tension with
the views of my government, which has instituted a major antitrust enforcement proceeding
against Visa and MasterCard, generally arguing that they have colluded to hinder competition
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merchant to get access to its cardholders, history shows that the rates
that American Express can charge are affected by the rates that the
162
larger Visa and MasterCard systems charge.
In Japan, by contrast, a merchant that wishes to accept credit
cards is confronted with a market featuring a large number of
clearance networks with a relatively small number of potential
acquirers in each market. Most merchants that accept credit cards
find it necessary to make arrangements with several of the large
Japanese systems because most of those systems clear and process
their own transactions: a typical merchant might accept a dozen or
more different cards and some accept as many as twenty-five. 163 Thus,
for each of those systems, the merchant faces a single system operator
with which it must reach an agreement. 16 4 It should be no surprise if
the charges in that market were higher than they are in the United
States.165
On the other hand, that problem should be mitigated in the
next few years with the increasing tendency of all of the Japanese
systems to issue cards with the Visa and MasterCard brand; cards
with those brands can be cleared through any entity that is a member

and innovation in the American card industry. For an overview of the case and links to
significant filings, see Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Case Filing:United States
v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/indx57.htm. For a vigorous and scholarly
rebuttal of the government's claims, see Zywicki, supra note 31, at 110-28. In any event, the
aspects of the credit card market that I describe favorably in this paper are not aspects that the
government has challenged in its action.
162. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 169-73, 185-97 (discussing pressure on
American Express merchant fees arising from the lower fees charged by Visa and MasterCard).
163. See Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70.
164. The process works much like the process for American Express transactions in the
United States, which typically are acquired and processed by the card issuer.
165. To be sure, the limited use of credit cards by Japanese consumers provides a
countervailing influence that arguably could push the discount rates down. The economics of a
merchant's decision to accept a card turn on the balance between (a) increased charges (discount
fees) on transactions that otherwise would have been made with cash (or some other payment
system cheaper for the merchant than the credit card); and (b) the likely profit from new sales
that would be gained by accepting cards. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 121-27.
Because the limited penetration of cards in Japan means that (b) is likely to be lower in Japan
than it is in the United States, a Japanese merchant's benefit from accepting a card is lower than
the benefit to a corresponding American merchant; that lower benefit would tend to push
discount rates downward. Yet another complication comes from the relatively small size of
Japanese retailers. If the typical Japanese retailer is smaller than the typical retailer in the
United States, and if there are fixed costs in the initial decision to accept credit cards, the
increasing size of retailers should have helped credit card acceptance to spread among Japanese
retailers. Giving the cross-cutting effects of those factors, it is, at best, difficult to predict that
Japanese discount rates would be higher or lower than American rates. The point of the text is
only that there are some market-structure reasons that could explain the observation of slightly
higher rates.
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of those networks. 16 6 If competition among members of those networks
lowers the rates for acquisition of transactions of those brands, the
large market presence of those brands should put pressure on the
discount rates for other brands in Japan just as it has in the United
States.167
One last explanation for the higher discount rates is the
relatively small size of the Japanese system. If discount rates are
affected by economies of scale in the development and use of
information technology, then it would be natural for the Japanese
system-in which fewer consumers use their cards less frequently-to
be somewhat more expensive per transaction than the American
system.1 68 That explanation does not necessarily suggest a long-term
difference, but it does support a pattern in which Japanese rates
tended to lag above slowly decreasing American rates. Although the
information that I have is sketchy, that seems to be the case: industry
observers and executives believe that the rates have been dropping
already during the last few years as Japanese patterns of usage drift
toward American patterns. 69 Thus, although the fraud problems
discussed above suggest that the rates should never be precisely
166. See Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 70.
167. See supra note 162. Another possible explanation for the higher discount rates is the
possibility that Japanese acquirers spend more to provide authorization terminals for their
merchants. Those terminals, which are relatively expensive, ordinarily are purchased by United
States merchants. In at least some contexts, Japanese acquirers support the costs that their
merchants incur for the acquisition of those terminals. It is clear, however, that there is no
universal practice of acquirers buying the terminals, so it is difficult to quantify the amount of
the difference attributable to that practice. See Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 88;
Anonymous Interview Seven, supra note 136.
168. Another reason for the smaller size of the system is Japan's relatively restrictive market
for credit information. American institutions can evaluate the creditworthiness and reliability of
even the smallest businesses quickly and accurately. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Information
Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing Transactions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1627 (2001)
(discussing the mechanisms by which businesses are evaluated). That is much more difficult in
Japan. See eCredit.Com to Start Real.Time B2B Credit Service in Japan, NIKKEI INDUSTRIAL
DAILY, Nov. 1, 2000 (discussing the nascent state of Japanese business credit scoring); see also
supra note 97 (discussing similar problems for consumer credit information). That problem is
exacerbated by the still relatively high number of small businesses in Japan (see supra note
165)-which makes it all that much more costly for credit card networks to gain full penetration
of the market. Thus, it is not surprising that Japanese credit card acquirers actually exclude
many merchants from their systems because of concerns about merchant character. See
Anonymous Interview Two, supra note 70; Anonymous Interview Three, supra note 70. Such an
exclusion would be almost unheard of in the United States, where the credit card systems
literally beg merchants to join and accept their cards. See Telephone Interview with Paul
Confrey, Vice President, Electronic Commerce Planning and Communications, MasterCard (Nov.
10, 1999) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Confrey Interview].
169. See, e.g., CREDIT INDUSTRY WHITE PAPER, supra note 90, at 14-15; Anonymous
Interview Three, supra note 70; Anonymous Interview Four, supra note 88; Anonymous
Interview Five, supra note 88; Anonymous Interview Six, supra note 130.
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equal, it seems unlikely that they will be substantially higher in the
long term.

The credit card systems of the two countries operate quite
differently, in markets of different sizes, with different lineups of
potential card-issuing institutions and card-receiving merchants,
facing a customer base that arguably has a significantly different taste
for the credit card. Thus, I finish my analysis not the least bit
surprised by the differences in the way the cards function in the two
countries. If anything, it is surprising that the results are converging
as rapidly as they are.
III. DEBIT CARDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Of course, credit cards are not the only card-based payment
system. In the last few years, the use of debit cards has grown rapidly,
especially in the United States. 170 A debit card is physically quite
similar to a standard credit card: a piece of plastic of the same
dimensions, with a magnetic stripe on the back. That stripe, like the
stripe on the credit card, includes not only the account number, but
also other information not known to the cardholder; the secret
information is designed to verify transactions in which the card is
swiped at a card reader. The defining difference from a credit card is
171
that the debit card necessarily is tied to a particular bank account,
with the result that funds for transactions that use the card are
172 Most
withdrawn from the account in one to two business days.
importantly, the funds are withdrawn from the account without
further action by the cardholder. A corollary of that aspect of the cards
is that debit card transactions require some form of online connection:
the merchant does not accept the card for payment until the merchant

170. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
171. See MANN, supra note 2, at 141-46.
172. See id. at 144-46 (discussing United States collection practices). In Japan, the funds are
removed from the cardholder's account immediately, but usually not received by the merchant
until at least the third business day. See Kdo Mdkettingu Kenkyfikai [SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY
OF CARD MARKETING], DEBIT-TO KADO DONYO KATSUYO NO TEBIKI Q & A [Q & A 100,
INFORMATION ABOUT DEBIT CARDS] question 27 (1999) [hereinafter DEBIT CARD Q & A]; Nihon
Debitto Kddo Torihiki Suishin Ky~gikai H5mu Iinkai [Legal Committee, Japan Debit Card
Promotion Association], Debitto Kddo no Shikumi Oyobi Sono Hoteki Wakugumi no Gaiy5 (1)
[The Structureand Legal Framework of J-Debit (1)], 1573 KINY'O HOMU 12, 13-14 (2000).
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can verify with the issuer that the issuer will remove funds from the
cardholder's account to pay for the transaction.173
The discussion of debit cards proceeds along the same lines as
the discussion of credit cards. This part starts by discussing and
explaining the differing patterns of usage. It closes with a tentative
discussion of the effectiveness of the still nascent Japanese debit card
system.
A. Usage in the United States and Japan
1.

Describing the Transactions

In the United States, debit cards are used for about six percent
of all retail payment transactions. 174 Because the data from which that
figure is derived include payments sent through the mail (or made
electronically)--payments for which debit card usage is quite rare-it
substantially understates the debit card's share of payments made at
the point of sale. Looking solely to retail purchase transactions, the
debit card in 1999 was used in about thirty-two percent of all cardbased transactions. 175 Even though the debit card transactions tend to
be relatively small (about $36, as opposed to $76 for the average retail
credit card transaction), 176 they still accounted for fifteen percent of
the total transaction volume at the point of sale (with industry sources
estimating that they will account for one-third of that volume by
2010).177
In contrast, the Japanese debit card system (J-Debit) is used
much more rarely. Specifically, J-Debit cards were used in December
2000 for just over 500,000 transactions, significantly less than one
percent of all card-based transactions. 178 It is interesting that the
average debit card transaction-contrary to usage in the United

173. See MANN, supra note 2, at 144-46 (discussing United States collection practices). For
Japanese practices, see Model Cardholder Agreement [hereinafter J-Debit Cardholder
Agreement], art. 2, reprinted in Nihon Debitto Kddo Suishin Ky~gikai HSmu Iinkai [The Legal
Committee of Japan Debit Card Promotion Association], Debitto Kddo no Shikumi Oyobi Sono
Hdteki Wakugumi no Gaiy6 (5) [The Structure and Legal Framework of J-Debit (5)], 1583 KIN'YU
HOMU 48-53 (2000).
174. See 1999 U.S. Payment Systems Data, supra note 1, at 6.
175. See 1999 U.S. Card Data, supra note 54, at 1, 5.
176. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
177. See 1999 U.S. Card Data,supra note 54, at 6.
178. I rely on statistics published on the J-Debit home page at http://www.debitcard.gr.jp.
The specific URL is http://211.2.244.164/downloadI48767089/debittorihiki.xls [hereinafter J-

Debit Home Page] (last visited May 1, 2000).
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States--is significantly larger than the average credit card
transaction: about V45,000 for the debit card transaction (about $400),
as compared
to Y25,000 for the average credit card transaction (about
17 9
$230).

The Y45,000 figure is somewhat misleading, however, because
it reflects a relatively small number of large securities transactions.
News reports from Nihon Keizai Shimbun suggest that securities
transactions averaging Y1,000,000 (about $90,000) are about one-third
of all J-Debit transactions. 180 Even if that figure seems exaggerated, it
is clear that the securities transactions are large and pull the average
transaction size up significantly. 18 1 Another large component of the
transactions are relatively large transactions at electronics stores,
doubtless driven by merchant desire to save money on credit card
transaction fees 82 as well as their desire to mitigate the risk of
fraud. 183 But even putting those unusually large transactions to one
side, the average transaction would be in the range of Y24,000 (about
$220),184 much larger than the average American debit card
transaction.
179. See J-Debit Home Page, supra note 178. The figure in the text is the average transaction
amount over the entire year. Although the amount has at all times been much larger than
comparable figures for American cards or Japanese credit cards, the specific amount should be
taken loosely, because it has varied considerably since March 2000 (when the full-scale program
began), ranging from a high in June 2000 of Y50,303 (about $450) to a low in September 2000 of
41,230 (about $370).
180. See Kokusai to Take Debit Cards for Securities Trades, NIKKEI WKLY., July 10, 2000, at
16 (reporting that securities trades are thirty percent of nationwide debit card usage and that
the average transaction amount at two leading brokers (Nomura and Daiwa) is about Y1,000,000
(about $9,000)).
181. The only published data from J-Debit (which covers March 2000, the first month of the
full-scale system) suggests that securities transactions amount to only 1.5% of the transactions,
and that the average amount of those transactions was V822,400 (about $7,500). See Nihon
Debitto Kddo Suishin Kybgikai [Japan Debit Card Promotion Association], Dai ni Fjzu Honkaku
Tenkai kara 1 Kagetu Debitto Kddo no Riy5 ga Ohaba Appu [The Number of Payments Through
J-Debit Has Significantly Risen Since the Start of the 2nd Phase], CARDWAVE, June 2000, at 52
[hereinafter J-Debit TransactionBreakdown Statistics].
182. As I explain below, debit cards in the United States are, at least from the perspective of
the merchant, considerably cheaper than credit cards. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying
text.
183. Electronics dealers might have the largest incentive to urge customers to use debit
cards because they probably have one of the highest average transaction amounts of any highvolume merchant in Japan. Those shops also might be driven by a high rate of fraudulent
transaction on credit cards at their store and a desire to limit their potential exposure in those
transactions. See supra note 138 (discussing problems with credit card fraud at electronics
stores). J-Debit statistics from March 2000 report that transactions at electronics stores were
thirty-four percent of all transactions and that they had an average amount of Y53,100 (about
$480). See J-Debit TransactionBreakdown Statistics, supra note 181, at 52.
184. See J-Debit Transaction Breakdown Statistics, supra note 181, at 52 (recalculating the
figure).
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Explaining the Differences

As with credit cards, the Japanese system differs from the
American system in having a much smaller number of much larger
transactions. The explanation for the transaction size doubtless is the
same here as in the credit card context. Because the debit card system
is not yet penetrating the market for small-dollar transactions, cash is
being used in Japan for the smaller transactions for which debit cards
18 5
are coming to be used in the United States.
But that explanation seems incomplete. The credit card system
faces similar differences, but it has had a substantial presence in
Japan for decades. The debit card system was only introduced,
however, in the spring of 2000. It is so strange to see a payment
system used for about a quarter of all card-based retail transactions in
the United States being introduced to Japan on a general basis so
recently 8 6 that some further explanation seems appropriate.
The first point must be that the American debit card, albeit
successful, has not itself been in use for very long. Although they first
were designed in the 1960s,18 7 debit cards gained a significant market
share only in the mid 1990s. 188 The key event was a fall in the cost of
PIN-pad point-of-sale terminals that made it practicable for
merchants to purchase the terminals. 8 9 So what the evidence
suggests for now is a delay in mass introduction of just a few
years-not decades of differences as in the credit card system.
Having said that, it remains unclear whether the debit card in
Japan will ever develop as successfully as the debit card in the United
States. The basic problem is that neither of the two main market
functions that the debit card serves in the United States are as
promising in Japan as they are in the United States. First, speaking
as an American debit cardholder, one of the primary roles of the
American debit card is to accommodate the relatively limited
willingness of American consumers to carry cash. 190 To the extent they
185. See supra text accompanying note 98 (articulating a similar explanation for the
relatively large size of Japanese credit card transactions).
186. A debit card system called Bank-POS was introduced in Japan in 1984, but remained

only as a local, barely used system, partly because of regulations requiring prior written
agreement for the transactions. The key event for the development of J-Debit was the lifting of
such restrictions in 1998. See JAPANESE BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 13, at 19.
187. See D. BAKER ET AL., THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS: LEGAL AND

STRATEGIC PLANNING 7.02 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the early history of the use of the debit
card at retail locations).
188. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 18, at 298-300.
189. See id. at 306-15.
190. See supra note 16.
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have a rational reason to use a debit card in preference to a credit
card, American consumers use a debit card because it limits the
frequency with which they must go to an ATM machine or bank to
obtain cash. Indeed, for many of us, the debit card itself might be the
most convenient source of cash because most merchants that accept
debit cards at the point of sale allow cardholders to use the card to
withdraw cash in connection with the purchase. 191 Because those
transactions carry no fees at all for the cardholder, they are attractive
to consumers. Japanese consumers, however, tend to carry more cash
than American consumers and also can obtain much larger amounts of
cash at each trip to an automated teller. 92 Thus, their need to use a
card for small-dollar purchases is much smaller. Hence, that market
niche for the debit card is much smaller in Japan.
A second market role that the debit card plays in the United
States is that it allows cardholders the quasi-rational convenience of
paying with a card without having to resist the risky temptation of
overextending themselves with credit purchases. 193 But Japanese
consumers do not need a debit card to have that comfort. They get it
by accepting ikkai barai as the method of payment with standard
Japanese credit card transactions. As explained above, 94 when a
cardholder pays by ikkai barai (as the overwhelming majority of
Japanese cardholders do), the funds for the transaction are removed
from the bank account without further action by the cardholder. Thus,
the ikkai baraicard does not present nearly the same temptations of
borrowing as the American credit card.
B. The Costs of the System
The Japanese debit card system is so young that it is
speculative to offer any firm analysis of its effectiveness. But enough
information is available from the general structure to support
generally positive inferences about its future effectiveness.
191. Because debit cards are so much cheaper for merchants than credit cards (compare
Table 2 supra, with infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text), it is rational for the merchants to
permit cash withdrawals, even if those withdrawals increase the fees the merchants must pay to
the bank for the transaction. Setting aside the cost to the merchant of having the cash on hand
(which seems unlikely to be large enough to alter the decision significantly), that would be true
until the point at which the cash withdrawals increase the total discount fee to an amount
greater than the discount fee would have been for a credit card transaction. Because PIN-based

debit cards often have fixed discount fees per transaction, it makes particularly good sense for
merchants that accept those cards to use "cash-back" services as a way to promote debit card use.
192. See supra note 16.
193. See RITZER, supra note 37, at 182.

194. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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1. Fraud Rates
On the issue of fraud, the Japanese system might not be
perfect, but it seems to be much safer than the American system. A
large share (more than two-thirds by value) of American transactions
use the PIN-less1 95 Visa and MasterCard debit products. 196 For those
cards, the fraud losses seem to be about the same as they are for
regular credit cards (six cents per hundred dollars). 197 For
conventional PIN-based debit cards, however, the fraud rate is much
198
smaller, about a twentieth as big (0.3 cents per hundred dollars).
In the J-Debit system, by contrast, all transactions are PINbased. 99 Thus, you would expect the fraud rate to be somewhere near
the American fraud rate of only 0.3 cents per hundred dollars. And
early results suggest that fraud is not yet a serious problem. 20 0 To be
sure, there are a few causes for concern. One problem is that the
Japanese banking system traditionally has not used encryption for
PIN-number transmissions because all ATM machines have been in
secure locations (generally inside bank locations). Thus, unlike the
United States, the use of debit cards at the point of sale is the first
time that cards giving access to a bank account have used terminals
that access the bank's computers over an open network. 20 ' It is thus
the first occasion at which the use of encryption has been crucial to
the safety of the system. Still, although it is necessarily difficult to
evaluate the security of the system from the outside, the available

195. Traditional debit cards require entry of a personal identification number ("PIN") at the
point of sale. The Visa and MasterCard debit products introduced in the mid-1990s, however, do
not require use of a PIN. For a general discussion of this trend, see MANN, supra note 2, at 14346.
196. See 2000 U.S. Debit Card Data,supra note 3, at 7.
197. See 1999 U.S. FraudData, supra note 123, at 4 (aggregating fraud rates for credit cards
and PIN-less cards).
198. See id.
199. See J-Debit Cardholder Agreement, supra note 173, art. 2.
200. As of January 2001, J-Debit still reports no claims of unauthorized transactions in its
system. See Debit Card Usage Exceeds 100 Bln Yen in Jan-Oct, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 13,
2000 [hereinafter Debit Card Usage] (offering no reports of fraudulent transactions as of October
2000), available at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp; Lower Debit Card Limits, supra note 16 (same as
of January 2001).
201. I use the term "open" to describe those networks because there are places from which
customers (or interlopers) can access the network that are not within the control of the financial
institution. See Naoyuki Iwashita, Business Needs for Cryptographic Technology in Japan's
FinancialIndustry, prepared for the 1999 International Workshop on Practice and Theory in
Public Key Cryptography (Mar. 1999) (on file with author) (discussing historical use of leased
lines for ATM-card transactions in Japan).
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information suggests that J-Debit is conscious of the need for reliable
202
encryption.
Observers also worry that PINs in Japan are not as secure as
PINs in the United States, relying on surveys indicating that about
one-third of Japanese use their birthdays as their PIN numbers. 20 3 If a
significant number of debit cards are stolen, that could become
something of a problem. Still, that seems such an easy problem to fix
that it is difficult to believe that the system operators would allow it to
become a significant problem. For example, a system in which banks
assign the PINs (as often happens in the United States) would solve
much of the problem immediately. 20 4 On the other hand, it is not
nearly so clear how system operators can assuage the strong consumer
20 5
perception that the system is unsafe.
Yet the United States systems that have used PINs for years
have experienced very low rates of losses as compared to card systems
that do not use PINs. And even those rates seem misleading, because,
according to industry observers, the losses are almost entirely
attributable to so-called "friendly" fraud: unauthorized transactions by
individuals (spouses, children, paramours) to whom the cardholders
voluntarily delivered the card and PIN. 20 6 It seems surprising, but

202. It appears that J-Debit contemplates encryption of transmissions from the merchant to
the clearance center by the same DES encryption used in the United States. See Iwashita, supra
note 201, at 1 (discussing use of DES encryption for United States PIN transmissions); Japan
Settlement Information Center, at http://www.jpsic.co.jp/servis2.html (last visited May 1, 2000).
203. See Debit Cards Getting Ready, supra note 152, at 15 ("Critics also warn that personal
identification codes can be stolen while being punched in at the store.").
204. It would be plausible to expect that Japanese system operators would have less concern
than American operators because the Japanese system places the risk of loss from unauthorized
transactions on cardholders, while the American legal system requires the issuers to bear that
risk. Compare Aoki v. K.K. Fujibank, 1369 KiNY'O HOMU 6, 6-8 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 1993)
(upholding a provision of a Japanese ATM-card agreement, holding that absent some special
circumstance a bank is not responsible when somebody other than the cardholder withdraws
cash from an ATM with the authentic card and correct PIN), with, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2000),
Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978 § 909 (limiting liability of debit cardholder for
unauthorized United States transactions to fifty dollars, unless the cardholder fails to report
either the theft of the card or unauthorized transactions that appear on the cardholder's
statement), and Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2002) (same). But the generally superior design
of the Japanese system (that is, its universal use of PINs) suggests that those legal provisions
are not unduly undermining the incentive of the Japanese operators to limit fraud losses.
205. See Only 3% of Japanese Use Debit Cards on Security Worries, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Dec. 22, 2000 (reporting survey indicating that forty-eight percent of respondents cited security
available at
cards),
not
using the
primary
reason for
as
their
concerns
http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp.
206. Cf. Kono v. Otsuyama, 1048 HANREI HANREI JIH6 109 (Tokyo High Ct., Apr. 28, 1982)
(concluding that a man who gave his cash card to a woman with whom he had a romantic
relationship implicitly consented to her withdrawal of funds with the card in any amount that
suited her).
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there appear in the United States to be no quantifiable number of
transactions in which interlopers have managed to steal both a card
and a PIN and successfully conduct transactions before the cardholder
advises its bank of the theft. For me, the lesson of that experience is
that Japan's entirely PIN-based system should be quite secure.
2. Discount Rates
Despite the relatively robust antifraud protections, the
Japanese system currently is considerably more expensive for the
participants in the transactions than the American system. Although
rates differ considerably from merchant to merchant, a typical
merchant would pay at least ¥50 on a Y5,000 transaction. 2 7 In the
United States, a grocery store with a similar transaction probably
would pay the equivalent of Y15-20 (about 15-20 cents). 20 8
Although the fee for now is higher than the analogous fee in
the United States, it seems unlikely to be a substantial problem. For
one thing, even though the fee is higher than the analogous United
States fee, it still is lower than the fee for any competing Japanese
payment system. 20 9 Moreover, the rates have not yet stabilized during

207. See DEBIT CARD Q & A, supra note 172, question 54 (explaining that the discount rate
varies based on negotiations between the acquiring bank and the merchant, and that it typically
ranges from one to three percent). As a matter of structure, the discount fee that the acquiring
bank collects from the merchant must be more than the interchange fee that the acquiring bank
pays to the issuing bank. See supra note 154 (discussing relation between merchant discount fees
and interchange fees in the credit card context). In the J-Debit system, the interchange fee
currently is one percent, with a floor of three yen and a ceiling of V100. See supra note 154.
208. The largest of the PIN-based networks, STAR, reportedly charges 12.5 cents for
supermarkets. Visa's Interlink PIN-based system (the second largest) charges 22 cents. The next
three largest PIN-based networks charge fees ranging from 8.5 to 12.5 cents. See Debit Card
Interchange, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), July 2001, Issue 744, at 1, 10
(reporting interchange fees of the largest PIN-based networks). The PIN-less VISA network
charges a flat fee of forty cents. See David Breitkopf, Visa to Raise Debit Fee Cited in Wal-Mart
Case, AM. BANKER, July 12, 2001, at 1, availableat 2001 WL 3912754.
209. The fee is cognizably lower than the fee for a bank transfer, the other common method
of noncash consumer payment in Japan. See supra note 89 (discussing Japanese use of bank
transfers). (It is difficult to generalize about bank-transfer fees, because the fee structures
typically have several tiers and differ from bank to bank. The cheapest fees for transfers to an
account
at
a
different
bank,
however,
typically
exceed
V100.
See
http://www.btm.co.jp/listj/tesuu.htm
(describing
fees
for
Tokyo-Mitsubishi
Bank);
http://www.fujibank.co.jp/jis/fb/service/tesuuryou.html (describing fees for Fuji Bank).) For
comparison's sake, the J-Debit fee is considerably lower than the fees that Visa and MasterCard
acquirers charge in the United States for their PIN-less debit card products. Those higher fees
have disturbed American merchants but have not stopped the rapid spread of use of the cards.
See Lisa Fickenscher, Visa Hires Exec to Strengthen Relationships with Merchants, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 12, 1999, at 8 (discussing a lawsuit brought by a group of merchants, including Wal-Mart
and Sears, against MasterCard and Visa, challenging the rules requiring merchants to accept
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the short life of the system; one observer suggested that the rates are
210
lower now than they were in the initial months of the system.
Finally, the structure of the market should foster considerable
competition that eventually should lead to good rates. The key point is
that there is only one debit card network for the whole country and
each merchant needs access to that network from only a single
bank. 21 1 That is the same many-acquirers/few-networks pattern that
United States merchants face when they want access to credit card
networks. 212 Thus, all of the banks in Japan that want to be in the
business of capturing J-Debit transactions must compete for the
213
business of each merchant.
To be sure, long-term merchant/bank relationships might give
merchants a significant preference for a particular bank within their
corporate family. But those relationships in the Japanese financial
industry seem to be weakening rapidly. 21 4 At this point, it is difficult
to believe that those relationships will be sufficiently strong to permit
banks to charge uncompetitive rates to related-company merchants for
their debit transactions. If one bank charges significantly lower rates
for the service than its competitors, it is highly likely to obtain a
substantial share of the market. 21 5 Thus, it seems unlikely that high
system costs will pose an obstacle to the success of the system.

It is much harder to draw firm conclusions about the Japanese
debit card system than the Japanese credit card system because its
baseline of operation is so short. But its major problem seems to be
that much of its market niche has been occupied by the general
mutation of the credit card in Japan into something that closely
resembles the debit card in the United States. The only real
differences that a debit card brings to Japanese consumers are that (a)
the more secure authorization makes the transactions safer (at least

the PIN-less debit card products issued by MasterCard and Visa members), available at 1999
WL 6033366.
210. See Anonymous Interview Eight, in Tokyo, Japan (Sept. 28, 2000) [hereinafter
Anonymous Interview Eight].
211. See id.
212. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
213. See Anonymous Interview Eight, supra note 210.
214. See HARNER, supra note 82, at 142-43.
215. See DKB Dominates Debit Card Deals, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 19, 2000, at 1, 1
(reporting that Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank has succeeded in becoming the sole or primary provider of
debit card settlement services for fifty-four percent of the merchants in the J-Debit program).
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compared to credit card transactions), and (b) the funds are removed
from the account much more rapidly. Neither of those differences
benefit cardholders significantly, so neither is likely to push
consumers toward the card rapidly. Moreover, consumer fears of losses
from inadequate security (whether or not rational) could hinder the
system even more.
Thus, although the system is much cheaper for the parties to
transactions, much more secure, and much more accommodating to
any Japanese preference for transactions that resemble "cash
payment" and avoid any hint of borrowing, it seems to have a
relatively limited chance of broad success in Japan. Absent any strong
reason for consumers to use the card-and no such reason seems
apparent at this point-it is likely to languish as a relatively minor
216
system, as it did in the United States for so many years.
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic message of this Article is a simple one: institutions
matter. Financial systems that develop in one country cannot be
transplanted without change to other countries that have different
institutional settings. If they are transplanted-as the debit card and
credit card have been-then the roles that they play will shift to
account for the backgrounds in which they are placed as surely as the
growth of new plants seeks the spaces between plants already nearby.
An understanding of the factors that influence that growth is
important not only to the businesses that want to develop more
effective payment systems but also to policy analysts who want to
limit the development of payment systems that can have harmful
effects on those that use them.

216. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

